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Abstract
Defined as "the division of public authority between two or more constitutionally defined orders of
government – and a set of ideas which underpin such institutions", federalism emphasizes issues such
as shared and divided sovereignty, multiple loyalties and identities, and governance through multi‐level
institutions. Proponents of federalism have linked federalism with improved economic and social
benefits, including increased political participation and personal liberties, efficient public and private
markets, and a check on governmental power. Nevertheless, few studies have attempted to empirically
prove these claims. In "Federalism's Values and Value of Federalism", Robert Inman created a multiple
regression model to assess the contribution of federal governance to a country’s economic and social
performance. Although Inman’s model provides an important empirical framework, his broad analysis did
not incorporate the unique context and history of different countries, or explain the variation in the results.
Hence, through a case‐study of six Latin American countries and analysis of key social, economic, and
rights indicators, this paper seeks to answer the following research question: How does federalism affect
the economic and social performance of Latin American countries? The conclusions are as follows: (1)
Diffusion of political power improves rights performance and democratic accountability, of which
federalism provides an important institutional framework, (2) The contribution of federalism to aggregate
economic performance remains ambiguous, (3) Decentralization improves access to public goods, in
both federal and unitary governments, (4) Federalism, however, potentially creates political fragmentation
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performance, democratic accountability, and economic and social progress may stall or deteriorate.
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Abstract: Defined as “the division of public authority between two or more constitutionally defined
orders of government – and a set of ideas which underpin such institutions”, federalism emphasizes
issues such as shared and divided sovereignty, multiple loyalties and identities, and governance through
multi‐level institutions. Proponents of federalism have linked federalism with improved economic and
social benefits, including increased political participation and personal liberties, efficient public and
private markets, and a check on governmental power. Nevertheless, few studies have attempted to
empirically prove these claims. In “Federalism’s Values and Value of Federalism”, Robert Inman created
a multiple regression model to assess the contribution of federal governance to a country’s economic
and social performance. Although Inman’s model provides an important empirical framework, his broad
analysis did not incorporate the unique context and history of different countries, or explain the
variation in the results. Hence, through a case‐study of six Latin American countries and analysis of key
social, economic, and rights indicators, this paper seeks to answer the following research question: How
does federalism affect the economic and social performance of Latin American countries? The
conclusions are as follows: (1) Diffusion of political power improves rights performance and democratic
accountability, of which federalism provides an important institutional framework, (2) The contribution
of federalism to aggregate economic performance remains ambiguous, (3) Decentralization improves
access to public goods, in both federal and unitary governments, (4) Federalism, however, potentially
creates political fragmentation that may block important reforms or give rise to a power vacuum for
populist leaders. As a result, rights performance, democratic accountability, and economic and social
progress may stall or deteriorate.
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Introduction
In 1979, William Riker proclaimed, “Although Americans seldom realize it, this is an age
of federalism – most of them derived and inspired by the Constitution of the United States.”1
The thirty years that followed showed this statement to be increasingly true. According to the
Forum of Federations, although only 24 of the world’s 193 countries currently utilize federal
political systems, their citizens comprise 40% of the world’s population. In addition,
approximately two countries make a transition to federalism each year, while many others
consider incorporating federalist elements into their constitutions.2 In particular, federations
account for most of the territory of North and South America, contained in Canada, the United
States, Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia, Brazil, Argentina, and the British West Indies.
Federalism’s appeal derives from a general conviction that decentralization improves
economic and political performance and accountability. Existing academic literature has
focused on federations and the ability of regional governments to shape economic reform
processes aimed at improving and instituting market mechanisms. Accountable to their own
electoral incentives, regional officials may eschew national government resistance to market‐
friendly initiatives and adopt their own entrepreneurial policies.3 Likewise, various
development experts and institutions have advocated fiscal and political decentralization as a
means to profoundly transform and improve the performance of the public sector. The logic
extends that by devolving authority over public goods, services, tax authority, and user charges
to the local level, decentralization encourages greater efficiency in the provision and
consumption of public goods due to a better understanding of local priorities and contexts.4
In regards to political performance, political scientists generally agree that based on
historical outcomes, federalism leads to different policy outcomes. Although the impact of
federalism on political participation, democratic stability, and political accountability differs
depending on the particular characteristics of the federal system and the distribution of power
within the society, theorists argue that federalism enhances democracy by providing checks

1

Riker, William. Soldiers of the State. Public Affairs Press, Washington. 1979.
Forum of Federations, “Federalism by Country.” <http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/by_country/index.php>
Accessed: 22 March 2008
3
Wibbels, Erik. Federalism and the Market. Cambridge University Press. New York, 2005.
4
Wiesner, Eduardo. Fiscal Federalism in Latin America: From Entitlements to Markets. Inter-American
Development Bank, 2003.
2
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and balances of existing governmental policies and practices. For example, a political party out
of power nationally may still retain residual power in regional and local offices. The party’s
divergent views or reservations to national government policies provide not only a source of
creative tension, but also promotes the effective criticism of government to strengthen
democracy and protect citizens’ rights.5
In order to empirically test the hypothesis that federalized government improves
economic and social performance, Robert Inman constructed a model that classified a sample
of 73 countries as a constitutionally‐based federal democracy, an administratively‐based
federal democracy, a unitary democracy, a federal dictatorship, or a unitary dictatorship. After
introducing additional controls to correct for bias, he created a multiple regression model of
governance structure on eleven measures of economic, democratic, and rights performance.
His conclusions were as follows: (1) decentralization does uniquely contribute to the protection
of property, political, and civil rights, (2) although policy decentralization and its benefits can be
achieved within a unitary government, constitutionally‐established provincial or state
governments provide an extra and important protective barrier for policy decentralization, (3)
adding policy decentralization or provinces does not improve economic or rights performance
in dictatorships.6
Although Inman’s model provides an important empirical framework to analyze the
contribution of federal governance to greater political participation, personal rights and
liberties, and public and private sector economic efficiency, his broad analysis could not fully
incorporate the unique context and history of different countries. In particular, given differing
historical and cultural contexts, the underlying rationale for the contribution of federal
governance to economic and social performance may differ by region. Hence, since Inman’s
empirical model spans across countries of differing income levels, geographic location, and
historical evolution, a case study would reveal critical insights to assess and supplement the
conclusions of the empirical model, explaining the variation within the model.
Research Question

5

Bodenhamer, David. Federalism and Democracy. Democracy Papers, U.S Department of State.
<http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/democracy/dmpaper4.htm>
6
Inman, Robert. “Federalism’s Values and the Value of Federalism” NBER Working Paper 13735, January 2008.
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This paper seeks to answer the following question: How does federalism affect the
economic and social performance of Latin American countries? During the course of the
nineteenth century rebellion against Spain, many Latin American countries created federal
governments, adapting the American model to their own circumstances. Although not all of
these federations survived – for example, Chile became a unitary state and the Central
American Federation dissolved – many of the largest countries in Latin American remain
federations.7 Since many Latin American countries share a similar culture and historical
evolution, a case study of countries with different governance structures can reveal
generalizable insights about the impact of governance structure on rights protection,
democratic accountability, and economic performance.
In terms of organization, this paper first summarizes the current state of federalism in
Latin America, providing theoretical foundations linking federalism and fiscal decentralization in
Latin America to improved economic and social performance. Second, the paper presents an
overview of the selected countries and explains the methods of comparison. Third, the paper
presents cases about each country, describing government structure, providing a table of
indicators, and explaining their implications. Fourth, the paper compares and contrasts
indicator results to determine whether governance structure did indeed improve economic,
rights, and political performance.
Summary of Results
The findings of the case study are summarized as follows:
1. Diffusion of political power improves rights performance and democratic
accountability, of which federalism provides an important institutional framework.
2. The contribution of federalism to aggregate economic performance remains
ambiguous.
3. Decentralization improves access to public goods, in both federal and unitary
governments.
4. Federalism, however, potentially creates political fragmentation that may block
important reforms or give rise to a power vacuum for populist leaders. As a result,
rights performance, democratic accountability, and economic and social progress
may stall or deteriorate.
7
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Federalism in Latin America
Definition of general concepts and terms
Defined as “the division of public authority between two or more constitutionally
defined orders of government – and a set of ideas which underpin such institutions”, federalism
emphasizes issues such as shared and divided sovereignty, multiple loyalties and identities, and
governance through multi‐level institutions.8 According to Edward Gibson, federalization has
meant a “process of political decentralization that has given greater protagonism to sub‐
national governments and political actors, has often heightened the importance of territorial
representation (as opposed to population representation) in national political institutions, and
has redistributed power and resources between levels of government.”9
Proponents of federalism have linked federalism with improved economic and social
benefits, including increased political participation and personal liberties, efficient public and
private markets, and a check on governmental power. In designing political structures for newly
formed states, federalism has emerged as a popular alternative, associated with attempts at
conflict resolution and political integration. As a contractual linkage, federalism provides for
power sharing, cuts around the issue of sovereignty, and supplements but does not seek to
replace or diminish prior organic ties where they exist.10 Given the high degree of ethnic,
religious or language fractionalization of in many countries, the federal principle has emerged
as a popular remedy for addressing seemingly intransigent political problems with a historical
basis in conflicting national, ethnic, linguistic, and racial claims.
According to the Inter‐American Development Bank, decentralization is a “process
whereby a country successfully adopts macroeconomic and sector policies to encourage the
provision and consumption of goods and services at a particular level of government –
institutional arrangement or policy area – where it will be most efficient to do so.”11
Prominently emerging during the past two decades as a key public sector reform in developing
countries, academics and practitioners have recommended decentralization as a means to
8

Knop, Ostry, Simeon, Swinton. Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World.
UBC Press, British Columbia, 1995.
9
Gibson, Edward. “Federalism and Democracy.” Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004.
10
Elazar, Daniel. Federalism as Grand Design. University Press of America, 1987.
11
Wiesner, Eduardo. Fiscal Federalism in Latin America: From Entitlements to Markets. Inter-American
Development Bank, 2003.
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improve government performance and support economic development. Inextricably linked with
democratization through the emphasis on giving citizens more voice in shaping public resource
allocation, many international development agencies have provided substantial financial and
technical support for decentralization initiatives. Nevertheless, Paul Smoke and other experts
have pointed out that the normative ideas of decentralization from social science often have
little empirical evidence or adequate consideration of the application of complex reform in
different contexts.12 Hence, analyzing the actual implementation of decentralization in a
particular country and its corresponding results provides a much more robust determination of
overall sustainability and impact.
Origins of Modern Federalism in Latin America:
Latin America’s three largest countries – Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina – are federal
republics, comprising 65% of the region’s population. Hence, understanding the dynamics of
federalism and analyzing its associated political outcomes is essential. In Latin America, the
debt crisis of the 1980s sparked dramatic changes in economic and political organization.
Coinciding with the beginnings of liberalization – the first movement of the transition to
democracy – the Latin American public sphere shifted politics from the state to the societal
level.13 As an alternative to the central state as an agent of national economic development and
fiscal management, Latin American governments transitioned towards increasing the
predominance of provincial and municipal governments in managing fiscal and administrative
responsibilities. In economic investment and production, private enterprise began to supplant
state‐owned enterprises. Given that the political features of federalism supported a structure
of decentralization, a profound redistribution of power occurred, empowering local governors
with political and fiscal resources with formal constitutional power.14
Simultaneously, disenchantment with the military governments of the 1960s‐1970s
erupted in mass participatory demonstrations against central authority and their abuses of civil
and human rights. Throughout the 1980s, power devolved from military authorities to civilian
parties, thereby validating federal institutions and empowering sub‐national actors. As in the
case of human rights movements in Argentina and Brazil, the mass mobilization of civilians
undercut the power of central authority, affirming the importance of rights protection as a non‐
12

Smoke, Gómez, Peterson. Decentralization in Asia and Latin America. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006.
Avritzer, Leonardo. Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America. Princeton University Press, 2002.
14
Gibson, Edward. “Federalism and Democracy.” Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004.
13
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negotiable matter.15 Likewise, urban social movements in Brazil and Mexico sought to improve
the material infrastructure of the urban poor through the creation of independent
neighborhood organizations. Challenging conventional forms of political mediation by refusing
to accept party incorporation for material benefits, these autonomous citizen organizations
profoundly changed local politics and the distribution of public goods.
As a consequence of the confluence of economic and political change, the growing
presence of alternative policies and institutional innovations firmly challenged the entrenched
central authority. Through liberalization and the discrediting of central authority, Latin
American societies restored political competition and increased the predominance of sub‐
national actors. Emphasizing local action and grassroots mobilization, collective action
increased the overall level of political participation, of which federalism provided an important
political framework.
In general, Latin America’s decentralization process can be organized into two distinct
periods – the “first generation period” beginning in the early 1980s and the “second generation
period” that begun in the late 1990s. According to a study by the Inter‐American development
bank, the first‐generation phase was largely characterized by:
1. Constitutional reforms that incorporated automatic and unconditioned transfers for the
central government to the sub‐national level (i.e.: Constitution of 1988 in Brazil,
Constitution of 1991 in Colombia)
2. Targeted fiscal transfers to specific sectors and to low‐income groups
3. Devolution of resources and responsibilities
4. Delegation of some limited taxing and spending authority
5. Lack of any independent evaluation of results
In this early phase, the government faced difficulties in managing the fiscal transfers
efficiently, especially when sequencing flaws, in which setting the revenue decentralization
target preceded devolution of responsibilities, led to a loss of accountability and duplication of
expenditures. In 1994, the Inter‐American Development Bank observed that other than Chile,
the transfer system in Latin America were severely flawed, especially since decentralization
policies failed to take into account market‐based principles, such as incentives and public
choice theory. In addition to destabilizing the overall macroeconomic framework, the transfer
systems did not increase sectoral decentralization or spur development of strong local
15

Avritzer, Leonardo. Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America. Princeton University Press, 2002.
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institutions in health, education, and other social services. In fact, decentralization increased
haphazard government spending, as sub‐national governments enacted initiatives with little
regard for budget constraints. As a result, serious fiscal problems emerged in Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela by the early 1990s.16
In an attempt to restructure decentralization policies, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico began
implementing a “second generation” approach, characterized by macroeconomic budget
constraints, a strong intergovernmental regulatory framework, and more intensive use of
incentives at the sectoral level.17 Overall, these reforms seek to create a market‐based system
of fiscal decentralization in order to harness the benefits of maximizing the efficiency of local
public goods and improving information at the local level, while minimizing the costs of fiscal
irresponsibility.
Case Study Selection
In his paper, Inman defines governance along three institutional dimensions – number
of provincial governments (N > 2 for federal; N = 1 for unitary), policy assignment for the
provision of important government services between central and provincial governments (A
close to 1 for federal; A close to 0 for unitary), and constitutionally protected provincial
representation to the central government legislature (R=1 for federal; 0 for unitary). Federal
and unitary governments may be either democratic or dictatorial (D=1 if democratic, D=0 if
dictatorial).
Inman then categories federal governments as having two or more provinces (N > 2),
each with substantive policy responsibilities (A close to 1) and provincially elected
representation in the central legislature (R=1). Unitary governments either lack politically
independent provincial governments, or if provincial governments lack independent policy
authority (A=0) or central government representation (R=0).
The following summarizes the methodology Inman used to assign values to countries:
• Policy Assignment (A): annual percentage of all government revenue raised by
provincial, state, and local governments, averaged over the years 1965‐1995. Mean
= .21 (S.D. = .16). A country is classified as an administrative federation (A=1) when
its score ranks in the upper two quartiles.
16

Wiesner, Eduardo. Fiscal Federalism in Latin America: From Entitlements to Markets. Inter-American
Development Bank, 2003.
17
Ibid.
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•
•

Democracy (D): Country has been considered democratic for 50 percent or more of
the years from 1960‐2000. Mean = .52 (S.D. = .50).
Central Government Representation (R): De jure, constitutionally‐based federation

To provide a meaningful contrast among different governance dimensions, the following
six countries were selected. Brazil and Argentina – Latin America’s largest federal republics –
serve as the benchmark case of federal democracy. All other cases differ along a governance
dimension in order to provide insight about the differential impact of institutional structure.

Benchmark Cases:
Federal/Democracy

Case #1:
Federal/Democracy,
but low provincial
revenue assignment
Case #2:
Administrative
Federal/Democracy

Case #3:
Federal/Dictatorship

Case #4:
Unitary/Democracy

Assignment (A): %
of revenue assigned
to locales

Provincial
Representation (R)
(Yes =1, No = 0)

Democracy (Yes=1,
No=0)

Chosen Cases (GDP
per capita)18

1 (close to 1 as
possible, in IV
quartile according to
Inman’s
classification)
0 (close to 0 as
possible)

1

1

Brazil (10,073)
Argentina (16,080)

1

1

Venezuela19 (7,480)

1 (close to 1 as
possible, in IV
quartile according to
Inman’s
classification)
1 (close to 1 as
possible, in III
quartile according to
Inman’s
classification)
0 (close to 0 as
possible)

0

1

Uruguay (11,969)

1

0

Mexico20 (11,369)

0

1

Chile (12,811)

18

GDP per capita data comes from 2006 estimates by the International Monetary Fund
Despite the fact that Hugo Chavez has concentrated the power of judicial and legislative branches and created
media restrictions, he still operates within a generally democratic framework. He was elected through free and fair
elections, and has not succeeded in making a blatant political move to radically undermine Venezuelan democratic
infrastructure. For example, Chavez acknowledged defeat on December 3, 2007 when voters rejected his public
referendum to change the constitution. The referendum would have overhauled term limits defined in the
constitution, placed more of the military under his control, permit media censorship in times of emergency, and
eroded the independence of the central bank. In addition, Chavez has to step down from power on January 2013.
20
Despite significant democratic reforms in Mexico over the past decade, Mexico is still categorized as a
dictatorship due to its long historical precedent of authoritarian rule and PRI dominance. Although the monopolistic
control of PRI was first challenged in the late 1970s, it was not until 1989 that the first non-PRI governor of a state
was elected. In general, democracy has been significantly entrenched in Latin American countries over the course of
the past two decades. According to the Economist Democracy Index (January 2007), no country in Latin America
received classification as an “Authoritarian Regime”. Mexico received a rating of 6.67, placing the country within
the “Flawed democracy” category.
19
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Benchmark Case: Federal Democracy – Brazil
From a historical perspective, Brazil endured a series of tumultuous political changes,
which has led to strong democracy and federalism in the most recent decades. Following a
military coup in 1964, significant centralization occurred, thus weakening pre‐existing federal
institutions. The military government centralized distribution of government revenue and
expenditures, and limited the representation and autonomy of state governments. In addition,
the government also eliminated important democratic checks, including the suspension and
repression of the legislature and enactment of preferential policies to strengthen executive
control.21 With the ousting of the military government in 1985 due to severe recession and
civilian outrage, Brazil embarked on a long process of democratic consolidation,
decentralization, and economic recovery. To provide a systematic check on the power of
centralized government, the 1988 constitution adopted significant reforms to ensure state and
local representation.
Divided into 26 states and a Federal District, with each state in turn divided into 5,500
municipalities, Brazil’s triple‐tiered government is regulated by the Federal 1988 Constitution.
In general, the constitution protects sub‐national autonomy by allowing states to adopt its own
constitution and directly elect its legislature and governor with very limited interference by the
federal government. Similar to the states, municipalities directly elect their own councils and
mayors. Paralleling the relation between federal and state government, state governments
have limited ability to compel or prohibit actions by municipalities in their jurisdiction.22
According to the most recent Handbook of Federal Countries, the republican regime in
Brazil has been marked by two general characteristics:
1. A plebiscitary presidentialism in which a strong President is sided by a symmetric,
bicameral, multi‐party, and regionalist, legislative power and an independent judiciary
2. A federative system which reproduces the presidential division of powers at the state
level and accords considerable constitutional autonomy to states and municipalities

21

Samuels, Mainwaring. “Strong Federalism in Brazil.” Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2004.
22
Wiesner, Eduardo. Fiscal Federalism in Latin America: From Entitlements to Markets. Inter-American
Development Bank, 2003.
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From a fiscal perspective, Brazil’s 1988 constitution explicitly divides up revenues,
assigning a specific tax base to each level of government and forming a system of tax sharing
that redistributes revenues among levels of government and regions. Overall, the creation of
new taxes, raising existing taxes, and increasing the transfer of Federal collected taxes to sub‐
national enhanced the financial capabilities of state and local governments.23 In particular, in
forming the broad‐based value‐added tax (ICSM), with rates freely determined by the states,
the constitution eliminated a series of state excises on communications, fuels, electric power,
minerals, and transportation. Likewise, the government eliminated federal exemptions and
restrictions on the use of funds by states as a means to reaffirm the revenue‐sharing system.24
As shown in the Table 1, the federal government share of total expenditures has largely
declined since the 1970s and 1980s when the Brazil remained under centralized, authoritarian
rule, dropping from 68.2% in 1980 to 59.9% most recently.
The recent increase in federal government share of total expenditures reflects the
tension between decentralization and macroeconomic stability, especially in light of recent
financial crises. In Brazil, recentralizing changes occurred as an indirect effect of the federal
government’s attempt to clamp down on hyperinflation in 1994. For example, the Real Plan of
1993‐1994 forced sub‐national governments to increase transparency in their expenditures,
thus exposing the debts of state banks. Due to the popularity of the plan, state governments
received a public mandate to keep fiscal accountability and reduce overspending.25

23

Castanhar, José. Fiscal federalism in Brazil: historical trends present controversies and future challenges.” VIII
Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública. Oct 2003.
24
Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto. Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America. Cambridge University
Press, 2006.
25
Eaton, Dicovick. “Decentralization and Recentralization in Argentina and Brazil: The Menem and Cardoso
years.” Decentralization in Asia and Latin America. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006.
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Table 1. Fiscal Division in Brazil (1960‐2000)
Share of Total Revenue
Year
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

Central
63.9
63.8
66.7
73.7
74.7
72.8
67.3
67.2
69.2

State
31.3
30.9
30.6
23.5
21.7
24.9
29.6
28.0
26.2

Municipal
4.7
5.9
2.7
2.8
3.7
2.4
3.1
4.8
4.6

Share of Total Expenditures
Central
59.5
54.8
60.8
68.0
68.2
62.7
57.1
56.3
59.9

State
34.1
35.1
29.2
23.3
23.3
26.2
28.0
27.5
25.1

Municipal
6.4
10.1
10.0
8.7
8.6
11.1
14.9
16.2
15.0

Source: Samuels, Mainwaring, “Strong Federalism in Brazil”, 2004
Table 2 summarizes some key social and economic indicators of Brazil, which will be
used as a basis for comparison to other Latin American countries. As evidenced in the data,
Brazil has enjoyed the benefits of prudent macroeconomic management in recent years, with
credible inflation targeting and considerable improvement in its external position. In 2000,
Brazil approved the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which broadly recognizes the importance of fiscal
rules to accomplish national economic objectives and the technical macroeconomic precepts to
reach fiscal targets. According to Afonso and de Mello, the Fiscal Responsibility Law forms the
basis of a “rules‐based system of decentralized federalism…and has been motivated by the
recognition that market control over sub‐national finances should be strengthened by fiscal
rules and appropriate legal constraints.”26 Brazil has largely recovered from the economic stress
of 2002‐2003, with real GDP growth reaching 3.5% in 2006. To enhance its growth potential,
Brazil would require further institutional capacity development, improvements in the efficiency
of the public sector, and sustained fiscal discipline.27 In addition, after instituting significant
democratic reforms after the ousting of the coup, Brazil has established a strong democratic
tradition that has lead to improving performance in civil and political rights. Elections are
deemed free and fair by independent observers, and Brazilians have voted five times in national
elections since the restoration of civil rule in the mid‐1980s.28

26

Wiesner, Eduardo. Fiscal Federalism in Latin America: From Entitlements to Markets. Inter-American
Development Bank, 2003.
27
“Brazil: Economic Overview.” Country Watch. 2007.
28
“U.S. Congratulates Brazil on October 29 "Free, Fair" Election” US Department of State. October 2006.
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Table 2. Key Social and Economic Indicators of Brazil (1970‐2006)
Brazil
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2006
GDP growth (annual %)
11.0
5.9
1.4
4.5
1.3
2.0
3.1
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
2,390.6
3,125.5
3,262.8
3,508.8
3,379.5
3,642.9
3,829.0
GINI Index
NA
NA
57.7
59.3
60.3
59.6
58.1
Household final consumption expenditure (per capita)
1,398.6
1,811.7
2,148.3
2,092.2
2,047.3
2,356.9
2,438.1
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12‐23 months)
NA
NA
53.6
59.2
72.8
85.2
97.3
Improved sanitation facilities (% of pop with access)
NA
NA
NA
NA
71
73
74.5
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural pop with access
NA
NA
NA
NA
37
37
37
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
59.3
61.6
63.0
64.8
66.5
68.5
70.4
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
NA
NA
34.1
29.4
27.9
22.4
21.8
Urban population (% of total)
58.16
63.98
68.96
72.7
76
79.16
82.98
Freedom House ‐ Political Rights
Freedom House ‐ Civil Rights
Transparency International ‐ Corruption Perceptions Index
Heritage Foundation ‐ Index of Economic Freedom

5
5
NA
NA

4
4.6
NA
NA

3.4
3
4.67
NA

2.2
2.2
3.51
NA

2.2
3.4
3.655
NA

2.4
4
3.94
53.1

2.4
2.8
3.5
62.0

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Transparency International,
Heritage Foundation
Overall, globalization has posed a significant challenge to Brazilian federalism through
three fundamental processes. First, financial deregulation has significantly increased foreign
currency and interest rate speculation, thus reducing overall government ability to manage
national macroeconomic policies. Second, due to differences in labor costs, fiscal load, and
infrastructure, foreign direct investment has penetrated sub‐national regions unevenly. Third,
the homogenization of economic policies in response to the debt crisis of the 1980s has opened
national economies to international trade, thus weakening the influence of the state and sub‐
national actors. As a consequence, Brazil faces the paradox in which globalization induces
centralization, but the centralized government loses significant influence as the economy
continues to liberalize.29
Implications
In perspective, federalism played an important role in strengthening democratic
institutions after a long period of military role. The constitutional structure of democratic
federalism provided an important check on government to ensure representation at local levels,
which military rule had suppressed. Federalism also provided an essential constraint on
presidential or executive power – a mechanism to prevent political rights abuses that had
occurred under military rule, such as the suspension of the legislature, purging of elected
officials without approval, and unlimited budgetary control by the executive.30 Simultaneously,
29
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federalism empowered the civil rights of citizens by strengthening democratic institutions at
the municipal level and increasing the ability of citizens to participate in local politics. For
example, Section II of the Federal Constitution of 1988 enshrines the civil rights of individuals –
an example of the reinforcing relationship between democracy and federalism, in which
federalism provides the structure to enhance the protection of rights essential to democracy.31
Unsurprisingly, the Freedom House scores of Brazil from the mid‐1980s onward demonstrate a
marked improvement – an example of democratization mutually reinforced by federal reform
and political decentralization. Federalism in Brazil, however, has also increased political
fragmentation as increased space for competition weakened the power of large political parties.
Currently, Brazil has an estimated thirty political parties, none with a majority, although 90% of
elected representatives belong to the six main parties.32 As a result, negotiations and obtaining
consensus on contentious policies has often proven difficult, resulting in stalled government.
Federalism’s effect on Brazil’s economic performance, however, remains much more
ambiguous. As Brazil’s history attests, various institutional factors influence the ability of
federalism to affect central government. Comparing Brazilian federalism from the 1980s to
early 1990s after the initial transition to civilian government to federalism in the late 1990s
under the Cardoso regime reveals important insights about the impact of federalism on
economic performance. In the early 1980s, federalism constrained the ability of the president
to enact much‐needed economic reforms. Especially given the high degree of political
fragmentation, obtaining political consensus to support comprehensive reforms proved difficult.
As a result, state debts to federal government burgeoned, state governments stalled much‐
needed macroeconomic stabilization policies,33 and institutional inertia resulting from new
layers of bureaucracy created obstacles for economic resiliency and flexibility. For example,
newly empowered states exercised fiscal powers irresponsibly, which impeded the central
government’s ability to reduce Brazil’s internal debt and establish macroeconomic stability – an
example of the challenges of first generation fiscal decentralization.
Federalism under the Cardoso regime, however, differed dramatically. By managing to
obtain multi‐party support and overcoming the divisive nature of political fragmentation,
Cardoso created coherency and consensus in the Brazilian government. In comparison to the
31
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earlier period, Cardoso managed to control inflation and improve macroeconomic stability with
broad support from Congress, which passed several important economic reforms. Since
Cardoso’s regime controlled over 70% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 80% of the
seats in the Senate during his first term34, Cardoso had the political capital and support to win
negotiations with state actors, even in the passing of various constitutional amendments and
the curtailing of state debt. Illustrating the complex bargaining game that federalism creates
between central and sub‐national actors, the relationship between federalism and economic
performance in Brazil depended on the political context and various institutional variables in
constant flux.
Benchmark Case: Federal Democracy – Argentina
In creating a theoretical framework for the universal origins of federalism, William Riker
developed the theory of the “federal bargain”, in which constituent units of a federation trade
sovereignty for security and military power. Under Riker’s theory, the two necessary
preconditions involve: 1) a group of individual polities exist, all with strong identities and
substantial sovereignty, 2) as a group they perceive external threats, which could conceivably
be mollified under a federation.35
According to Gibson and Falleti, however, Riker’s theory fails to take into account the
unique geopolitical conditions that led to the Argentine federation. Although international wars
and security threats existed, they did not occur continuously, apply consistently to all
constituent elements of the federation, or coincide with the two major federal milestones – the
1931 Argentine Confederation Pact and the constituent assembly of 1853 (inauguration of the
Argentine Federation). Rather, Argentine federalism emerged as a response to interprovincial
conflict between “centralizers” and “peripheralizers”.36
To address the issue of inter‐provincial conflict, the 1853 Argentine constitution
established a republican, representative, and federal form of government, instituting a clear
division of power among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. In addition, the
Constitution explicitly protects the autonomy of provincial and municipal governments. Article I
of the constitution proclaims the establishment of a “federal republican form of government”,
34
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with Article V asserting that each province would enact its own constitution in accordance to
the principles of the National Constitution in return for the latitude to fully exercise its own
institutions independently. In Section 14b, the constitution also explicitly endows national and
provincial entities with “financial and economic autonomy” to enact social policies. Most
notably, Section 123 affirms that each province “enacts its own Constitution, ensuring
municipal autonomy” in “institutional, political, administrative, economic, and financial
aspects.”37
Throughout Argentine history, the principles of decentralization in the Constitution have
endured various periods of suspension. For example, during the populist Peronist era,
centralization increased with federal revenue collection and spending, though the provinces
benefited from the expanded largesse of the federal government. In 1949, the federal
government raised taxes from 1.5% to 8.0%, thus providing a substantial windfall of revenues
to regional governments. In fact, Cayeros contends that Perón maintained his popularity with
provincial officials by keeping the federal bargain. On the other hand, Perón harmonized many
regional social and public works programs under his Five Year Plan and the total revenue share
transferred to regional governments, approximately 20%, remained the same as before. Most
notably, during his second administration, Perón adopted a reform that established that taxes
earmarked for investment and public works with a national impact would be excluded from the
total revenue pool available for the provinces, even though the money would eventually be
spent on the provinces. In essence, this important reform limited the discretionary spending of
provincial governments in favor of national action.38 When the military coup disposed of the
Peronist government, centralization further increased, especially since the hierarchical and
authoritarian rule reduced the level of provincial autonomy. Hence, the series of military
governments enhanced the centralization that had started to occur under the Peronist
government.39
Since the ousting of military rule in 1983, Argentina has gradually increased the level of
fiscal decentralization. As aforementioned, the constitution directly mandates sub‐national
governments to provide the majority of social expenditures and economic infrastructure, from
37
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education, health services, and welfare systems to roads, ports, and the management of natural
resources. Nevertheless, the national government plays an important regulatory role in
overseeing the programs and preserving a baseline of quality, often in the form of
supplementing the poorest programs. As a consequence of constitutional structure, Argentina
has one of the most decentralized public sectors in Latin America, in which sub‐national
governments account for nearly 50% of total consolidated public sector expenditures and more
than two‐thirds of public sector expenditures, excluding pensions.40
Table 3. Key Social and Economic Indicators of Argentina (1970‐2006)
Argentina
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2006
GDP growth (annual %)
3.7
2.1
(0.1)
(1.4)
6.8
2.3
2.8
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
6,905.3
7,053.1
6,921.9
6,303.9
6,665.1
7,746.6
7,518.6
GINI Index
NA
NA
NA
44.5
45.4
49.2
52.1
Household final consumption expenditure (per capita)
7,400.9
7,222.3
NA
NA
8,353.4
8,781.6
8,197.8
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12‐23 months)
NA
NA
52.6
73
82.2
82.2
84.5
Improved sanitation facilities (% of pop with access)
NA
NA
NA
NA
81
86
90
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural pop with access
NA
NA
NA
NA
45
59
78.5
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
67.1
68.7
69.9
70.9
71.9
73.0
74.3
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
NA
NA
NA
2.0
5.8
10.1
18.2
Urban population (% of total)
79.74
81.76
83.74
85.8
87.48
88.6
89.7
Freedom House ‐ Political Rights
Freedom House ‐ Civil Rights
Transparency International ‐ Corruption Perceptions Index
Heritage Foundation ‐ Index of Economic Freedom

4
2.5
NA
NA

4.4
4.8
NA
NA

4
3.6
4.94
NA

1.8
1.4
5.91
NA

1.4
3
3.055
NA

2.2
3
2.96
71.5

2.1
2.3
2.9
61.2

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Transparency International,
Heritage Foundation
As Table 3 illustrates, Argentina has endured a volatile economic history. In the 1990s,
Argentina’s GDP grew tremendously at an average rate of 6.8% between 1990 and 1994. By the
late 1990s, however, inflexible economic policies and a failure to adopt essential structural
reforms left the country vulnerable to external shocks.41 In order to combat inflation, Argentina
had adopted a fixed exchange rate regime, simultaneously liberalizing markets. Nevertheless,
government debt continued to escalate as social expenditures increased and as the
government adopted an import‐substitution policy to promote industrialization. In 2001 and
2002, currency speculation and massive withdrawals of capital drove Argentina to near
economic collapse, in which GDP registered a negative growth rate of 4.4% and 10.9%
respectively. Coupled with skyrocketing inflation and an erosion of currency value, the
government declared bankruptcy on foreign debt. Since 2003, however, Argentina has largely
recovered as consumer and investor confidence slowly improved.42 As a consequence,
40
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Argentina has experienced strong growth, though controlling inflation and instituting structural
reforms remain a challenge. Similar to Brazil, Argentina’s rights performance has improved
substantially with the abdication of the military regime in 1983 and the restoration of
democratic accountability.
Implications
Similar to Brazil, returning to the federal constitution of 1853 after a long period of
military rule represented a conscious effort to diffuse power through a federal arrangement.
Political decentralization not only enhanced the power of regional governors, but gave
individuals additional voice and representation through increased independence from the
central government.43 Consequently, political rights steadily improved as individuals and
various civil society organizations, such as neighborhood associations and human rights
organizations, increased their public presence, demanding changes that the central
governments sometimes did not approve. Likewise, fiscal and administrative federalism
increased citizens’ access to basic needs, especially since decentralization of important social
welfare programs improved overall access. As empirical support, Habibi, et al. conducted a
study on the social impact of decentralization, in which two indicators of health and education
were regressed on two decentralization measures in Argentine provinces from 1970‐1994. The
study concluded that decentralization positively influences the effectiveness of public policy
directed towards an improvement in the level of human development. According to the authors,
decentralization reduced intra‐regional disparities and increased on aggregate the level of
human development in the areas of health and education.44 Hence, administrative and fiscal
federalism has contributed to improved social performance in Argentina.
Comparing the Menem presidency of the early 1990s to earlier administrations reveals
insights about the impact of federalism and decentralization on economic performance.
Although Menem’s government spurred a series of reforms that strengthened the level of
responsibility of regional governments, such as introducing the Decentralization Bill of 1991 to
decentralize education, the administration centralized authority of tax revenues as a means to
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maintain a stable, liberal agenda at the national level.45 Unlike his presidential predecessors,
Menem managed to evade the constraints of the 1987 Co‐Participation law, which would have
forced a level of revenue decentralization. Various experts argue that without control over
provincial revenues, Menem would not have the capacity to implement neoliberal reforms such
as privatization, tariff liberalization, and deregulation. Increasing central authority in the
economy, however, has yielded mixed results. In the short‐term, Menem’s administration
reduced inflation through a pegged exchange rate, restored foreign investor confidence, and
reined in rampant macroeconomic issues that earlier administrations had struggled with.46
Despite Argentina’s strong growth in the 1990s and seeming improvement in various
macroeconomic indicators in the short‐term, the country bordered on the verge of economic
collapse in 2001‐2003, since greater decentralization did not lead to fundamental
improvements in macroeconomic responsibility and spending restraint. By 2000, an estimated
40% of Argentine's population lived below the official poverty line despite the country’s earlier
wealth.47
When comparing Argentina to Brazil, the other large federal republic in Latin America, it
appears that decentralization and federalism in both countries contributed to strengthening
democratic institutions, improving political and civil rights, and increasing access to public
goods. Economic results, however, illustrate mixed conclusions. Initially, federalism and
decentralization impeded macroeconomic stability in Brazil, especially since sub‐national actors
often enacted policies without appropriate fiscal constraint and Congress blocked important
macroeconomic reforms introduced by the executive branch. Effective political bargaining
under Cardoso’s regime, however, revealed that important economic reforms could be enacted
under a federal governance structure if party alignment occurs. In some sense, “centralizing”
congruency between officials at different tiers and branches of government proved essential. In
contrast, in Argentina, although centralization of tax revenues and fiscal power in the central
government led to initial macroeconomic improvement in comparison to earlier
administrations that had a greater level of fiscal decentralization, the results were short‐lived as
neoliberal reforms failed to deliver sustained benefits.
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Case #1: Venezuela (Federal / Democracy but low provincial revenue assignment)
Comprised of 22 states, one federal district, and 72 island dependencies, Venezuela has
a long history of federal traditions. On December 21, 1811, the General Congress of Venezuela
adopted the first Constitution of an independent Latin American state. Modeling the federalist
principles of the US Constitution, Venezuela created seven colonial provinces, all of which had
never previously been under one governing body before.48 Enabling the union of independent
states, the Constitution contained the precepts of federalism: the predominance of state
sovereignty and republicanism, supremacy of the Constitution as a representation of the will of
the people, separation of powers, territorial distribution of power, and declaration of citizens’
and states’ rights.49
Nevertheless, federalist principles came under challenge when a series of civil wars
resulted in the dissolution of the First Republic in 1812. In fact, Simón Bolivar – the Liberator of
South America – attributed the failure of the Venezuelan republic to federalism. To promote
solidarity, Bolivar introduced centralism, evidenced in the constitutional reorganization of
Venezuela in 1819 and in its disappearance and integration into the Republic of Colombia in
1821.50 By the first half of the 20th century, consolidation of the National State by autocratic
regimes reinforced centralizing tendencies, almost provoking the disappearance of territorial
distribution of power and autonomy.51
Similar to the evolution of other Latin American countries, democratization in the latter
half of the 20th century accompanied a return to federalist principles. In response to the Pacto
de Punto Fijo of 1958, an agreement of the three principal political parties to guarantee the
consolidation of Venezuelan democracy, the 1961 constitution re‐established political
federalism. Although provinces gained greater voice, the president retained the prerogative to
appoint state governors personally, reflecting the parties’ belief that national democratic
consolidation needed to precede democratic transition at the provincial level. Although the
Senate guaranteed equal territorial representation to the states with additional party
provisions, the constitution did not assign important fiscal and administrative responsibilities to
48

Brewer-Carías, Allan. “Problems of the Centralized Federation and Sub-national Constitutionalism in Venezuela.”
Center for State Constitutional Studies. March 2004.
49
“Venezuela.” Handbook of Federal Countries. Forum of Federations, 2002.
50
Ibid.
51
Brewer-Carías, Allan. “Problems of the Centralized Federation and Sub-national Constitutionalism in Venezuela.”
Center for State Constitutional Studies. March 2004.

21

the states. With limited ability to raise revenue through taxes or sustain administrative
responsibilities, the state governments depended on national governments for support.
Nonetheless, the constitution assigned each state fiscal resources by an automatic budget
allocation equivalent to at least 15% of the nation’s income, of which 30% was assigned equally
and the remaining 70% was based on population. 52
By the late 1980s, however, increasing competition and electoral opportunities at the
sub‐national level and the re‐election of governors and mayors profoundly transformed the
political system. As political decentralization advanced, politicians began building their careers
in municipalities and state government, rising from the sub‐national to the national level. To
gain support from political parties, successful politicians needed to demonstrative
administrative and political success at the sub‐national level, incentivizing a greater importance
to local politics and support of regional initiatives. By 1991, the transformation of the political
system empowered regional actors to call for the expansion of fiscal decentralization. Taking
advantage of the changing environment, governors and mayors collectively organized in 1989
to pressure Congress to transform the structure of revenues at the regional and local levels. 53
In December 1999, a new constitution replaced the 1961 Constitution, primarily
promoted by current president Hugo Chávez. As the first constitution approved by popular
referendum in Venezuelan history, the Constitution significantly changed the structure of
Venezuelan government and enshrined a series of basic rights claims of the people, including
free education and health care, environmental stewardship, and protection of the rights of
minorities to uphold their own cultures. With 350 articles, the Constitution comprehensively
addresses a series of complex social and political issues. Article 4 of the Constitution declares,
“The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a decentralized Federal State on the terms set forth in
this Constitution, governed by the principles of territorial integrity, cooperation, solidarity,
attendance and shared responsibility.” In addition, Article 136 asserts that “Public Power is
distributed among Municipal Power, that of the States Power and National Power. National
Public Power is divided into Legislative, Executive, Judicial, Citizen and Electoral. Each of the
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branches of Public Power has its own functions, but the organs charged with exercising the
same shall cooperate with one another in attaining the ends of the State.”54
In practice, however, the Venezuelan federation remains relatively centralized, in which
states have a rather minimal role in developing public policies. Despite the principles of
federalism in the 1999 constitution, the 1999 constitution reflects a much greater degree of
centralization than that of the 1961 constitution, especially in fiscal policy. In regards to
taxation, the Constitution reserves the power of taxation to the federal government only –
state and local governments have providence only over official stationary and stamps. Article
167 articulates that states can collect taxes only when the National Assembly expressly
transfers the power of a specific form of taxation by law, which has not yet occurred.55 Under
the current National Budget law, states claim a minimum of 15% to a maximum of 20% of total
national income. To supplement income, states with hydrocarbon reserves can claim additional
economic privileges or make additional claims from national funds, such as the
Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization or the Interstate Compensation Fund.56
In addition, the 1991 constitution fails to enumerate substantive competencies and
responsibilities of the sub‐national governments in important matters of social and economic
policy. By eliminating the Senate, Venezuela has adopted a federal government in name, but
without a federal chamber in which states have equal representation. In addition, the
constitution explicitly asserts that delegates to the National Assembly ought to represent their
own principles and conscience about the greater national good, above the mandates and
instructions of their representative state.
According to Diaz‐Cayeros, Venezuela is the most centralized of the Latin American
federations, of which the centralized fiscal bargain involves the abdication by the states of all
tax authority and the virtual abandonment of federalism. Coupled with lack of strong state
representation and power, the federal government could eschew promised transfers to states.
Especially since the federal government controls oil revenue, the state maintains strong
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discretion in fund allocation, which has bred redistributive allocation policies to small states at
the expense of larger, more productive regions.57
Table 4. Key Social and Economic Indicators of Venezuela (1970‐2006)
Venezuela
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2006
GDP growth (annual %)
3.9
4.0
(1.8)
1.5
4.0
0.9
4.2
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
6,172.0
6,344.4
5,339.2
4,929.1
5,131.9
5,041.8
4,727.4
GINI Index
NA
NA
55.8
48.8
41.7
49.2
46.1
Household final consumption expenditure (per capita)
1,801.8
2,729.3
3,003.9
2,757.9
2,797.1
2,527.9
2,611.4
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12‐23 months)
NA
NA
50.8
55.4
64.8
60
75.5
Improved sanitation facilities (% of pop with access)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
68
68
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural pop with access
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
48
48
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
65.6
67.7
68.6
70.2
71.7
72.5
73.7
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
NA
NA
8.9
6.6
5.1
15.1
14.8
Urban population (% of total)
73.28
77.24
80.4
82.74
85.56
89.18
92.5
Freedom House ‐ Political Rights
Freedom House ‐ Civil Rights
Transparency International ‐ Corruption Perceptions Index
Heritage Foundation ‐ Index of Economic Freedom

2
2
NA
NA

1.4
2
NA
NA

1
2
3.19
NA

1
2.2
2.5
NA

1.8
3
2.5425
NA

2.4
3.2
2.54
55.5

3.3
4.3
2.2
52.3

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Transparency International,
Heritage Foundation
Table 4 illustrates some clear economic and social indicators for Venezuela. Dependent
on hydrocarbon sales, which account for approximately 80% of total exports and half of the
national government’s revenue, Venezuela’s economy remains subject to cycles of boom and
bust.58 Since GDP growth and investment correlate strongly with world oil prices, Venezuela
faces the significant challenges of economic diversification, controlling inflation in times of high
oil prices, and providing sustainable long‐term growth. Most recently, real GDP grew by 10.3%
in 2005‐2006 and 8.0% in 2007, reflecting the benefits of the fiscal windfall driven by high oil
prices, which in turn have fed private consumption and fixed investment.59
Given the recent administration, democratic accountability has weakened, as evidenced
in the Freedom House indicators. Hugo Chavez has pushed for various reforms that significantly
concentrate power in the executive branch, while limiting decentralization and representation
of sub‐national governments. Late 2007, Chavez announced his intent to amend the 1999
constitution with proposals such as: abolition of term limits for president, redefinition of
private poverty, removal of the autonomy of the Central Bank of Venezuela, and introduction of
“communal councils” at the local government level.60 The public, however, handed Chavez a
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defeat in December 2007 by a close margin of 2%. Nevertheless, various institutions of the
1999 Constitution have been weakened with the concentration of power in the executive
branch, especially in the judicial system. Bypassing important checks and balances, the Chavez
administration dissolved the First Administrative Court, which handles cases brought by citizens
against the state. The administration has also expanded the size of the Supreme Court and
reduced the barriers of judicial appointment.
Implications
Unlike the other Latin American countries in this case study, Venezuela has slowly
increased the level of centralization, moving away from its long federal traditions – most
notably in the recent Chavez administration. Testifying to the constant tension between
centralization and decentralization in a federal democracy, the case of Venezuela illustrates the
difficulty of categorizing the government structure across various institutional dimensions.
Although the 1999 Constitution declares Venezuela a federation, in practice, the government
has progressively centralized revenues and reduced representation and responsibilities of the
sub‐national governments in social and economic policy.
As Table 4 of key social and economic indicators reveal, political and civil rights have
eroded over time. Unlike the other Latin American countries in this study, Venezuela did not go
through a military dictatorship – the country had remained a democracy in the 1970s, when
most Latin American countries fell under military rule. 1958 marked the arrival of full
democracy in Venezuela, with the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez’s dictatorship. Hence, Venezuela
had a much more stable democracy and protection of civil and political rights in the 1980s
compared to other countries. Recently, however, Hugo Chavez’s regime and its acts of political
suppression have reduced the overall level of democratic accountability in Venezuela.
Although the intuitive conclusion may be to associate increasing centralization and the
undermining of federal institutions with deterioration in rights performance, this conclusion
fails to capture important historical facts. Certainly, although Chavez’s initiatives to concentrate
power in the executive branch reflect simultaneous erosion in federal institutions and political
rights, various experts have argued that federalism itself caused the fragmentation of political
parties that led to populist presidencies, such as that of Chavez.
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According to Penfold‐Becerra, the enhanced political competition, the division between
regional and national elections, the reelection of governors and mayors, and an increase in
their financial autonomy through national party leaders – all characteristic aspects of
federalism – contributed to the fragmentation of the party system and to the personalization of
the vote. With intensified political competition that federalism provides, governors and mayors
took advantage of windows of opportunity to enhance their own political power and weaken
the power of party leaders. Certainly, many of the national politicians who at first supported
direct election of governors and mayors in 1989 – an important federal reform – did not
envisage the emergence of a new political system that would undermine the traditional power
structure of party politics. Nevertheless, as accountability, transparency, and political
competition increased, personalization of the vote undermined entrenched powers. Taking
advantage of the power vacuum, political outsiders, such as Chavez, gained access to regional
and local offices, as well as to the presidency and the national legislature.61 Coupled with the
concentration of fiscal power at the central authority, such populist leaders have great latitude
to enact policies that potentially undermine democratic rule, especially given the dependence
of state governments on federal revenues and the high level of discretionary fiscal power.62
Hence, federalism has a rather ambiguous effect on democratic accountability and
rights performance in Venezuela. Although the current weakening of federal institutions under
the Chavez regime has decreased rights performance, federalism itself had contributed to a
new political context that facilitated the rise of such populist leaders. Nevertheless, despite
Chavez’s success in increasing presidential power, he remains unable to undermine the full
federal system. Despite the elimination of the senate, direct election of governors in 23 states
and mayors in more than 300 hundred municipalities check his overall level of power and
counterbalance presidential privilege in the executive branch. In some sense, the defeat of
Chavez’s constitutional amendments in December 2007 reflects the activation of the federal
system and democracy.63 Regardless, federalism’s dynamic in Venezuela reveals the complex
nature of the effects of increased political competition on democratic accountability and rights
performance.
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Case #2: Uruguay (Administrative Federal / Democracy)
As a presidential representative republic, Uruguay is a unitary government with a high
level of fiscal decentralization. As a small country of three million people – with approximately
half living in the capital city of Montevideo – sub‐national governments traditionally lacked
significant economic or social roles. Nevertheless, according to an Inter‐American Bank study,
when placed into comparative perspective, Uruguay ranks highest in Latin American in terms of
proportion of public expenditure managed by sub‐national governments. In addition, despite its
unitary structure, the Uruguayan government provides for one of the greatest participation in
sub‐national governments in total public expenditure. Although falling behind the large
federalist states of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, Uruguay’s sub‐national governments
proportionally spend more than all other countries of Latin America, with exception of Bolivia
of Colombia.64 In fact, in 1996, Uruguay ranked sixth in Latin America in its decentralization
effort. Moreover, despite a unitary constitution and traditions, Uruguay ranked first in Latin
America with regard to political autonomy and participation at the sub‐national level.65
In regards to territorial distribution, Uruguay consists of nineteen departments,
governed by municipal officials with terms of five years. The members of the Departmental
assembly form the legislative body of each department. The most recent 1967 constitution and
its associated reforms establish a presidential representative democratic republic, guarantee a
bicameral legislature with representation from the departments, and explicitly assert a unitary
form of government.66 In addition, the structure of the Senate limits provincial representation,
especially since elected officials must follow party discipline in voting matters rather than local
priorities. Section 16 of the Constitution explicitly outlines the structure of the departmental
governments. In particular, Articles 273 and 275 enumerate the main responsibilities of the
Departmental assembly and the intendente (official), which include: enacting the laws of the
government and Constitution, managing provincial budgets, defining taxes and price controls,
and creating local policies and projects.67
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Despite a long unitary tradition, decentralization in Uruguay has been largely driven
from a top‐down approach. Over the past two decades, sub‐national political offices have risen
in responsibility, power, and appeal. Similar to the situation in Chile, however, decentralization
occurred as a result of a national‐level political game, in which national politicians decided to
devolve responsibilities to the departments. Unlike the situation in Argentina and Brazil, in
which sub‐national actors played an important role in pushing decentralization, sub‐national
officials remained relatively passive in Uruguay throughout the process of decentralization.68
Both expenditures and resources available to sub‐national governments have increased relative
to the central government, measured as a percentage of GDP and a percentage of total
government expenditures, while the Constitutional reform of 1996 introduced additional
measures to transform the role of departmental governments. As an example of further
decentralization at the local level, in Montevideo, the Departmental assembly passed a decree
in 1993 to create a decentralized municipal and administrative structure through Zonal
Community Centers. Aspiring towards social, political, and administrative decentralization, the
initiative established direct participation of the people in local government, transferred
decision‐making to district bodies, and devolved the administrative organizational structure.69
According to an Inter‐American Development Bank study, these trends have fostered an
extremely competitive political environment at the sub‐national level, in which local politics
play a key role in electoral politics and party strategies. As a result, the influence and power of
local political elites on their parties and on the entire political system has significantly risen.
Coupled with increasing fiscal responsibilities for providing public goods and services, the
current trend towards decentralization has resulted in some issues of fiscal indiscipline.70
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Table 5. Key Social and Economic Indicators of Uruguay (1970‐2006)
Uruguay
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2006
GDP growth (annual %)
0.8
4.6
(2.8)
4.2
4.3
2.2
1.7
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
4,045.9
4,641.0
4,767.1
4,715.4
5,388.3
6,234.8
6,120.5
GINI Index
NA
NA
43.7
42.3
NA
44.5
44.7
Household final consumption expenditure (per capita)
3,085.3
3,057.5
3,041.7
3,058.9
3,650.6
4,513.7
4,345.5
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12‐23 months)
NA
NA
62.4
77.6
93.8
91.6
93.5
Improved sanitation facilities (% of pop with access)
NA
NA
NA
NA
100
100
100
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural pop with access
NA
NA
NA
NA
99
99
99
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
68.8
69.6
70.7
71.9
72.8
73.7
75.0
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
NA
NA
3.7
2.7
NA
4.6
4.8
Urban population (% of total)
82.8
84.2
86.12
87.92
89.6
90.82
91.7
Freedom House ‐ Political Rights
Freedom House ‐ Civil Rights
Transparency International ‐ Corruption Perceptions Index
Heritage Foundation ‐ Index of Economic Freedom

4
4.5
NA
NA

5.6
5.6
NA
NA

5.2
4.6
NA
NA

1.8
2
NA
NA

1.2
2
3.21
NA

1.4
2
4.38
66.2

1.0
1.0
6.3
68.8

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Transparency International,
Heritage Foundation
Table 5 presents some key economic and social indicators in Uruguay. Dependent on
agricultural and livestock exports and economic linkages to its larger Latin American trade
partners, notably Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay’s economy remains vulnerable to adverse
external shocks. As shown in Table 5, from 1999‐2002, Uruguay suffered a severe recession as a
result of spillover of the currency crisis in Argentina and serious debt sustainability problems.
Since the crisis, Uruguay’s economy has recovered with a favorable external environment, the
adoption of structural reforms to improve macroeconomic stability, and the implementation of
various initiatives to restore market confidence and strengthen the financial system. Coupled
with strong export growth performance, GDP grew 6.6% and 4.0% in 2006 and 2005,
respectively. Nevertheless, due to Uruguay’s excessive dependency on agricultural exports and
its regional trade partners, the underlying roots of economic vulnerability still persist.71
Uruguay’s rights performance has improved substantially – a result of democratization
after the ending of military rule. In particular, the leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front) achieved
prominence, creating a movement to engage civil society to create a democratic and socially
equitable regime. Since its foundation in 1971, the Frente Amplio had campaigned against
authoritarian rule, garnering broad support from leftist coalitions. When the Frente Amplio
assumed control of municipal government in Montevideo, the party implemented a series of
important movements and initiatives that supported decentralization and the
institutionalization of democracy. Most predominantly, the Frente Amplio reorganized
municipal administration in order to increase social and political accountability, prioritized
71
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social investment and equitable access to urban public goods, and advocated decentralization
as a natural response to neoliberalism.72
Implications
Similar to other Latin American countries, a military government ruled Uruguay until the
early 1980s, when a plan announced the return to civilian rule. Since the first national elections
in 1984, Uruguay has implemented a series of significant democratic and economic reforms, as
evidenced in the improvement of rights indicators in Table 5. Nevertheless, Uruguay still
retained its unitary governance structure, although the intendentes and legislature of the
departments gained more significant administrative responsibilities. As aforementioned,
despite its unitary constitution and traditions, Uruguay ranks first in Latin America with regard
to political autonomy and participation at the sub‐national level. In addition, through fiscal
decentralization, sub‐national governments retain a significant amount of responsibility, albeit
less than the large federal republics of Brazil and Argentina, but much more than the rest of
Latin America. Comparing Uruguay to Brazil and Argentina reveals interesting results, especially
since although all three countries have experienced a similar historical trajectory – military
dictatorship, democratization, increase in administrative responsibility at the sub‐national level
through fiscal federalism – Uruguay retains its unitary structure according to the Constitution.
In regards to political and economic rights, Uruguay has achieved marked improvement,
in step with Brazil and Argentina. Similar to using federalism as a mechanism to promote
democratic accountability and diffuse centralized authority, Uruguay instituted elections at the
municipal level and improved the institutions of direct democracy. To illustrate, in the last 15
years, citizen referendums have repealed laws and modified the constitution, from confirming
amnesty to military leaders to protecting water resources and obstructing the privatization of
public utilities. 73 In fact, despite the Constitution’s declaration of unitary governance, the
government of Uruguay reflects a high degree of political and fiscal decentralization (at the
departmental and municipal levels), similar to that of federal republics. In essence, Uruguay’s
governance structure closely parallels that of federal democracies.
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The difference, however, fundamentally lies in size. As a small country, Uruguay does
not need to establish a complex governance structure with various layers of bureaucracy in
order to effectively mediate regional and local interests. In addition, although representatives
of the national legislature have a mandate to serve the entire country rather than advocate the
interests of a territory – in conflict with the principles of federalism – Uruguay’s small size
makes the two objectives nearly congruent, especially since approximately half of the
population resides in the capital city of Montevideo. With only two layers of government –
departmental and central – Uruguay has created an effective democratic environment with
significant political and fiscal autonomy at the local level. Hence, the implications suggest that
diffusing power and increasing political participation at the local level does not necessarily
require a federal governance structure. In short, although federalism enhanced rights
protection and democratic accountability, as in the case of Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay’s
unitary government accomplished the same end through alternative means.
From an economic perspective, Uruguay’s fiscal decentralization has also created issues
of indiscretion by sub‐national governments, as in the case of Argentina and Brazil, especially
when responsibilities and resources lack clear definition. In federal countries, sub‐national
officials can circumvent fiscal constraints through public debt issuance both domestically and
internationally. Although the sub‐national authorities of unitary governments such as Uruguay
do not have these channels to misbehave, an Inter‐American Development report revealed that
sub‐national governments find other ways to finance non‐compliance through accumulating
debts with other government agencies and obtaining discretionary transfers from the central
government.74 Hence, even unitary governments face the difficulties encountered by federal
governments as result of administrative decentralization. Weighing the costs of fiscal
irresponsibility against the benefits of increased access to public goods at the local level,
however, yields an ambiguous result. Although Filgueira, et al. claim that decentralization
potentially inhibits processes of fiscal discipline, especially when sub‐national governments
become a last resort for clientelistic policies, administrative decentralization has improved
equitable access to public goods and greater citizen participation in the definition of budgetary
priorities. Hence, an important policy recommendation is that if central authorities better
delineate the responsibilities of sub‐national authorities and create a transparent system of
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inter‐governmental transfers with clear rules and regulations, then countries could obtain the
benefits of administrative federalism while minimizing the costs of fiscal irresponsibility.75
Case #3: Mexico (Federal / Dictatorship)
The 1917 Constitution establishes Mexico as a federal republic – Article 40 states that “it
is the will of the Mexican people to organize themselves into a federal' democratic,
representative Republic composed of free and sovereign States in all that concerns their
internal government' but united in a Federation established according to the principles of this
fundamental law.”76 Nevertheless, although the Constitution declares a federal government, in
practice, Mexico has been extremely centralized, both politically, and economically, until
recently. Moreover, despite the guarantees of democracy and representation in the
Constitution, Mexico achieved neither until the 1990s.77
Under the Constitution, the president has substantial power, with the ability to appoint
important public officials in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches with limited
oversight. In fact, until 1997, the president also appointed local officials in the Federal District.
In addition, the central government retained substantial power in social policy. Until the 1990s
when the government first began to decentralize health and education, the federal government
had exclusive responsibility in key areas of policy, including commerce, education, health, labor,
agriculture, energy, natural resources, and food policy. Despite the fact that the constitution
reserves residual power for the states, nearly all of the provisions in the constitution limit state
influence, enhancing the economic and political power of the central government. In regards to
fiscal power, the federal government collects all income taxes and consumption taxes. Although
states and municipalities eventually receive a share, the criteria for resource distribution
remain contentious, especially since the federal government exercises a significant amount of
discretion in allocation.78
As described by Acosta Romero: “ The theory of our federalism may run deeply, but the
practical realities are such that the powers of the political and policy processes have become
increasingly centralized in the republic's federal executive...Mexican federalism is an aspiration
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punctuated by the reality of an undeniable centralism which is characterized by an increasingly
pervasive presidency.”79
In the past two decades, however, decentralization efforts have occurred in conjunction
with the democratization movement. As a means to promote more equitable regional
development and divest excessive responsibilities, the federal government transferred health
and education to the state governments, increased the share of revenue available for sub‐
national governments, and set more transparent standards for fiscal allocation. Nevertheless,
the central government retains significant control over key areas of decision making.80
Regardless, increasing political pluralism and the renewal of federalism in political debate has
led to a substantial effort to identify a federal arrangement which can meet developmental
inequities, with particular emphasis on administrative, spatial, and economic decentralization.81
In regards to the impact of decentralization initiatives, Ochoa‐Reza argues that federal
features exerted important influence in the promotion of Mexico’s democratic transition. By
opening new electoral spaces at the sub‐national level, federalism allowed opposition parties to
enter into competition with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) – thus activating the
federal system. When sub‐national opposition politicians gained power, they mobilized
supporters to reform electoral laws to provide an essential democratic check against the
dominant party. Collectively, these pressures influenced the national government to re‐
evaluate and re‐negotiate legal and institutional measures that eventually contributed to
democratic consolidation. More importantly, as federal opened up space for political
contestation at lower levels of government, increasingly democratic multiparty participation
across three levels of government not only promoted democracy, but began to transform the
precepts of the constitution into a working federal framework.82
For the purposes of this case study, Mexico is categorized as a dictatorship under
Inman’s methodology as a result of its long history of repressive, authoritarian rule. In
perspective, until the election of Vicente Fox in 2000, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
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had controlled the presidency for 71 years.83 After the fall of dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz in
1910, all revolutionary leaders united to form the modern‐day equivalent of the PRI party,
which ruled as a virtual one‐state party until 1988, supported by massive electoral fraud and
strict internal discipline. In fact, in a debate with Octavio Paz in 1990, Mario Vargas Llosa
described Mexico's political system as "the perfect dictatorship".84 Currently, although Mexico
is still considered a “Flawed Democracy” by the most recent ranking by the Economist,85 Mexico
has made important progress in democratic reform,86 as evidenced in the improvement in
rights indicators shown below in Table 6.
Table 6. Key Social and Economic Indicators of Mexico (1970‐2006)
Mexico
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2006
GDP growth (annual %)
6.4
6.4
3.4
1.2
3.9
2.9
2.9
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
3,784.0
4,375.6
5,157.1
4,813.9
5,139.8
5,288.8
6,018.6
GINI Index
NA
NA
46.3
NA
51.1
48.8
49.2
Household final consumption expenditure (per capita)
2,778.5
3,060.4
3,475.5
3,218.8
3,584.1
3,491.8
4,194.1
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12‐23 months)
NA
NA
44
55.6
80.8
94.8
93.8
Improved sanitation facilities (% of pop with access)
NA
NA
NA
NA
58
67
77
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural pop with access
NA
NA
NA
NA
13
25
39
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
62.2
65.3
67.2
69.4
71.8
74.3
74.7
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
NA
NA
39.7
NA
22.5
27.7
18.5
Urban population (% of total)
60.52
64.2
67.62
70.76
72.86
73.92
75.5
Freedom House ‐ Political Rights
Freedom House ‐ Civil Rights
Transparency International ‐ Corruption Perceptions Index
Heritage Foundation ‐ Index of Economic Freedom

4.5
3
NA
NA

4
3.4
NA
NA

3
4
1.87
NA

3.8
3.8
2.23
NA

4
3.8
3.165
NA

3.6
3.8
3.56
59.6

2.1
2.3
3.4
63.3

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Transparency International,
Heritage Foundation
Table 6 contains some key economic, political, and social indicators of Mexico. In
perspective, since the 1980s, the Mexican economy has undergone a profound transformation
as a result of economic liberalization and the joining of the North American Free Trade
Agreement in 1994. As the 12th largest economy in the world on a PPP basis, Mexico has one of
the highest per‐capita incomes in Latin America, and is the only Latin American country in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).87 Since the 1994 crisis,
Mexico’s macroeconomic fundamentals have improved substantially through significant policy
changes and economic structural reforms, thereby producing a stronger and more stable
economy. Fiscal consolidation has reduced the public debt, and credible monetary policy has
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lowered inflation to meet the central bank target of 3.0%. Hence, from 1995 to 2006, GDP
growth averaged 3.6% per year.88 Buoyed by exports and strong investment, GDP growth
peaked at 4.8% in 2006, though labor productivity comprised a very small percentage.89 As an
export‐oriented economy, Mexico has a highly open economy, with exports accounting for
approximately 31.9% of total GDP in 2006.
Implications
As described by Romero, Mexico attests to a clear situation in which the principles
established in the Constitution did not translate to political reality. As a result, classifying
countries as federal versus unitary requires much greater attention to detail than merely
looking at Constitutional mandates. For example, although the Constitution creates a federal
republic of free and sovereign states, sub‐national governments had very minimal power in
economic and social policy until relatively recently. Reflected in PRI dominance, the president
exercised substantial powers that limited the oversight and influence of other governmental
branches. In addition, sub‐national governments faced significant resource constraints, and the
central government’s tax sharing policies reflected a degree of discretion that bred clientelism
and the entrenchment of existing power structures.
Fundamentally, however, Mexico’s example illustrates how federal institutions
positively influence democratization – a fundamental element of rights performance. Similar to
Brazil and Argentina, Mexico’s strengthening of federal institutions opened up new electoral
spaces that promoted political party competition that eventually led to reform and
democratization. In addition, the federal structure provided an important institutional check
against existent power structures. Ochoa‐Reza further confirms that federal reforms played an
essential role in democratic consolidation, especially since from a historical perspective, the
various decentralization reforms of 1986, 1991, and 1993 simultaneously strengthened the
federal system while improving democratic accountability.90
In direct contrast to Venezuela and Brazil, however, in which federalism resulted in the
fragmentation of political society into multiple regional parties – a common anticipation in
federal systems – regional actors in Mexico participated within polity‐wide parties, thus
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strengthening a unified coalition against the PRI. In fact, federalism played an essential role in
improving electoral transparency and facilitating the presidential transition from the PRI party
to the “Alliance for Change” candidate Vicente Fox in 2000 – a coalition formed by the National
Action Party (PAN) and the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM). According to Rodriguez,
federal institutions not only provided a horizontal check on presidential power in Mexico
through the legislature and judiciary branch, but also created a vertical cooperative framework
of responsibility and mutual support among different levels of government,91 all which
ultimately improved political and civil rights.
In regards to federalism’s affect on social performance, federalism in Mexico has a
rather ambiguous result. In general, the government has made great strides in decentralizing
education expenditure, removing infrastructure construction funds from presidential discretion,
and increasing revenue sharing among levels of government. In particular, funds for regional
development witnessed a substantial transformation, as in the case of the Social Infrastructure
Fund which evolved from discretionary allocation to allocation based on transparent poverty
and public service needs.92 Decentralization, however, has created many additional challenges
of equity and appropriate resource allocation. For example, on a per‐capita basis, education
decentralization led to increasing inequity in per capita transfer of education funds among
regions. Skoufi and Shapiro’s 2006 evaluation of the Mexico’s Quality Schools Program (PEC)
confirmed the exacerbation of the issue of inequity. Nevertheless, repetition, dropout, and
failure rates decreased overall in schools where parents and teachers jointly developed school
improvement programs, excluding indigenous areas.93 In theory, fiscal and administrative
federalism should reduce intra‐regional inequities, as in the case of Argentina, but the opposite
has transpired in education in Mexico, in which increased fiscal decentralization exacerbated
regional resource inequities. In perspective, however, given that central government has a
monopoly over taxes and governmental revenue, sub‐national actors remain dependent on the
economic resources of the government, signifying that full administrative federalism has not
yet occurred in Mexico. As a result, it remains difficult to draw a direct connection between the
level of administrative decentralization and regional inequity in the provision of social goods.
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In regards to the impact of federalism on economic performance, Mexico’s federal
reforms of the 1990s coincided with economic liberalization and profound economic transition,
which generated income growth, investment, and productivity increases. The direct link
between federalism and economic reform, however, remains tenuous, especially since fiscal
federalism has created additional difficulties of fiscal irresponsibility at the sub‐national level,
similar to the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Given that Mexican exports to the United
States account for nearly a quarter of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and more
than 80% of total exports94, however, Mexico’s economy inextricably links to that of its
northern neighbor. Nevertheless, in aggregate, Mexico’s economic performance has improved
steadily with structural reform, facilitated by greater fiscal discipline on the part of central
government. Such comprehensive economic reforms, however, required unified national action,
which potentially would not have occurred if Mexico had been fully decentralized politically at
that time. For example, Salinas used his broad powers as a PRI president to pass NAFTA,
leveraging the strong coalition of his party to pass the treaty despite popular resistance to trade
liberalization, even among PRI’s constituents.95 Under a more federal and democratic
government, however, such a contentious treaty would have encountered much more political
resistance. As aforementioned, federalism can create political competition and divisiveness that
limits the ability to enact major policy changes, as in the case of Brazil before the Cardoso
administration. In summary, although federalism played a key role in democratization in Mexico,
its effects on social and economic policy remain indeterminate.
Case #4: Chile (Unitary / Democracy)
Since its independence in 1810, Chile has had a long unitary tradition, further
strengthened under military rule. As a relatively small unitary state consisting of 15 regions, 51
provinces and approximately 346 municipalities, Chile’s current institutional structure was
developed under the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, who ruled the country
from 1973 to 1990. The Constitution of 1990, created under Pinochet’s supervision for
transition back to civilian rule, explicitly states in Article 2 – “The State of Chile is unitary. Its
territory is divided into regions. The law shall provide that administration thereof be functional
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and territorially decentralized.”96 Nevertheless, municipalities and regional governments have
specific responsibilities and powers in the administering, delivering social services, and
investing in infrastructure.
From a historical perspective, under Pinochet’s regime, strict military authority and an
ideological desire to reduce the involvement of the state in the economy created an odd
combination of central control at the national level and decentralization at the municipal
level.97 Pinochet established a military hierarchy of government, in which governors headed
provinces and mayors oversaw municipalities. Directly named by the President and loyal to the
central government before their own territories, appointed sub‐national officials ensured the
influence of the national government at all levels. In attempting to improve efficiency in the
provision of public goods to parallel the private market, however, Pinochet streamlined
government and devolved a significant level of administrative responsibility to the
municipalities. Acting like ‘service delivery agents’, municipal governments provided local public
service on a cost‐effective basis, without having local governing power. As a result,
decentralization extended Pinochet’s hierarchical control, consistent with his political and
macroeconomic objectives.98
From a historical perspective, Chile’s transition to democracy only occurred relatively
recently, when a Constitution establishing a transition itinerary was approved in 1980. Despite
significant political repression and human rights atrocities, Pinochet instituted a series of
important economic reforms. Coined by Milton Friedman as the “Miracle of Chile”, Pinochet
liberalized the economy, privatized state‐owned enterprises, stabilized inflation, and
encouraged foreign investment. Labor discipline imposed through repression of unions,
liberalization of prices, exchange rate devaluation, increased investment in public works, and
high copper prices spurred GDP growth and investment.99 Unsurprisingly, Chile’s free‐market
experience has been celebrated as a testament to the success of the neoliberal developmental
paradigm – used as a model for many other countries. Even after the end of the Pinochet
regime, democratic leaders continued the neoliberal economic reform initiated by the military
government.
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Nevertheless, despite success in controlling inflation and stabilizing the economy, the
free market reforms led to a widening income gap, increased poverty, and unemployment.
Many critics challenge the basis of the “Miracle of Chile”, arguing that the celebrated economic
growth must be viewed in light of the catastrophic recessions of 1975 and 1982, that poverty
widened dramatically as the percentage of those living in extreme poverty doubled from 1970
to 1990, foreign debt skyrocketed, that environmental standards decreased, and that many
important export gains can be explained away by fortuitous factors in the greater global
economy.100
Recently, Chile has made decentralization a priority. While maintaining fiscal restraint
and strict macroeconomic accountability, Chile’s decentralization initiatives have focused on
building institutions, developing processes, and creating the right incentives to flow from
processes and institutions. Rather than wide‐open devolution of resources and competencies,
Chile has favored selective and sectoral decentralization, most notably in health and
education.101 In addition, Wiesner argues that unlike the decentralization initiatives of other
Latin American countries, Chilean decentralization has achieved greater progress as a result of
the application of tight fiscal and budget constraints, combined with incentives to enhance the
efficiency of overall public and private resource allocation. Although transfers from national to
the sub‐national level comprise approximately 0.7% of GDP, experts caution that simply larger
transfers do not indicate that real and effective decentralization has occurred. In fact, under,
Chile’s unique system of intra‐municipal transfers, wealthy provinces have transferred up to
41% of their municipal‐level tax revenues. 102
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Table 7. Intergovernmental Shares of Total Expenditures (Net of Transfers, % of Total)
Chile - Intergovernmental Expenditure Shares
National
Regional
Municipal
Total

1990
91.4
1.1
7.5
100

1995
90.4
1.4
8.2
100

2000
89.6
1.5
8.9
100

Chile - Tax Revenues by Level of Government
National
Municipal
Total

1990
92.8
7.2
100

1995
92.6
7.4
100

2000
91.4
8.6
100

Source: Wiesner, 2003; Ministry of Finance Budget Office
Hence, despite centrist tendencies and low central government transfers to sub‐national
actors, Chile has embarked on a significant process of decentralization, albeit different from the
typical model in Latin America given its strict fiscal discipline. As shown above in Table 7, the
share of expenditures concentrated at the regional and municipal levels has grown modestly
along with tax revenues raised at the municipal level, though the rising trend towards
municipalization should also be viewed in light of increasing incentive‐intensive sectoral
decentralization and greater sub‐national policy influence.
Table 8. Key Social and Economic Indicators of Chile (1970‐2006)
Chile
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2006
GDP growth (annual %)
1.6
3.4
1.3
7.4
7.3
5.4
4.2
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
2,234.9
2,083.7
2,361.7
2,667.0
3,520.3
4,613.1
5,289.6
GINI Index
NA
NA
NA
57.2
55.3
57.5
56.3
Household final consumption expenditure (per capita)
1,807.2
1,434.9
1,666.9
1,635.0
2,168.6
2,941.3
3,424.8
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12‐23 months)
NA
NA
95.8
94.6
92.6
92
94.2
Improved sanitation facilities (% of pop with access)
NA
NA
NA
NA
84
87
90.5
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural pop with access
NA
NA
NA
NA
52
57
62
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
63.0
67.2
70.0
72.3
74.0
75.4
77.6
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
NA
NA
NA
24.5
12.2
9.7
7.6
Urban population (% of total)
76.5
79.5
81.8
82.9
83.7
85.0
86.9
Freedom House ‐ Political Rights
Freedom House ‐ Civil Rights
Transparency International ‐ Corruption Perceptions Index
Heritage Foundation ‐ Index of Economic Freedom

4
3.5
NA
NA

6.8
5
NA
NA

6
5
6.5
NA

5.4
4.4
5.5
NA

2
2
6.6
NA

2.2
2
7.4
73.8

1.6
1.3
7.2
76.6

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, Freedom House, Transparency International,
Heritage Foundation
As shown above in Table 8, Chile has one of South America’s most stable and
prosperous nations. Overall, Chile has the highest nominal GDP per capita in Latin America.
Within Latin America, Chile leads in terms of competitiveness, macroeconomic stability,
economic freedom, low corruption perception, human development, democratic accountability,
and political stability. According to the most recent Global Competitiveness Report, Chile ranks
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as the 26th most competitive country in the world.103 Although Chile bests other Latin American
countries in terms of fiscal restraint and macroeconomic management, the country ranks fourth
worst in terms of income distribution in Latin America and 80th in the world, behind much
poorer countries such as Zambia, Nigeria, and Malawi.104
Implications
From various economic and social perspectives, Chile outpaces the rest of Latin America.
As the least corrupt and most business‐friendly country in Latin America, Chile has harvested
the benefits of foreign investment, income growth, and productivity increases. Chile’s
performance, however, is less attributable to its unitary governance structure, but rather on an
important precedent set under the dictatorship of Pinochet.
In regards to the impact of unitary government on economic performance, Pinochet’s
dictatorship had the power to suppress wages and institute austere macroeconomic reforms,
such as privatization despite increased unemployment and forced economic liberalization.
Before 1973, Chile had a long turbulent history of democratic rule with chronic inflation and
uneven economic growth, especially since democratic politics often polarized political
consensus, thereby impeding important macroeconomic and structural reforms.105 Through
authoritarianism combined with centralized, unitary rule, Pinochet transformed Chile from one
of the poorest countries in Latin America to one of the wealthiest from an aggregate
perspective.
The fact that Pinochet managed to set a precedent for Chilean economic development
that continued through its democratic transition, however, represents a singular example – not
reflective of unitary governments as a whole. The military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay all centralized government and created varying degrees of unitary rule, but failed to
accomplish macroeconomic reform. In fact, in all three cases, severe macroeconomic
mismanagement of the 1980s debt crisis provided an important political impetus for
restoration of civilian rule. As a result, Pinochet’s purported “miracle” in Chile reflects less on its
unitary structure, but on the specific policies of the administration. Unitary and centralized rule,
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however, does increase the ease of enacting comprehensive reform. Without political
competition or dissent, Pinochet could implement unpopular policies, such as the sale of state‐
owned enterprises despite severe unemployment and the privatization of public utilities. By
taking an austere defense of private property, Pinochet created a business environment that
incentivized investment from abroad by restoring confidence that business transactions would
be enforceable with force. On the other hand, dictatorships have also entrenched opportunities
for acute corruption and the misuse of public resources for private gain. A survey of
dictatorships in the world today exposes the fact that plenty of autocratic rulers exist without
accomplishing important macroeconomic stabilization reforms. Hence, one cannot conclude
that unitary governments and dictatorships always produce beneficial economic results.
From a rights perspective, Chile falls in line with the other Latin American countries in
this case study. Despite its unitary structure, Chile has improved democratic accountability,
providing for checks and balances against authority. Every four years, Chile holds nationwide
presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections. Voters elect 38 senators and 120 deputies
for parliament, and one mayor and a full body of councilmen per municipality. Similar to
Uruguay, given Chile’s small population and geographic area, traditions of direct democracy and
political participation at the plebiscitary level emerge strongly. Hence, the evidence suggests
that unitary governments can accomplish the same level of rights performance as federal
governments, despite the absence of greater influence of sub‐national governments. In essence,
paralleling the political decentralization of federal governments, democratic consolidation in
unitary governments focuses on strengthening representation and responsibility at the
municipal and local levels of government.
From a social welfare perspective, Chile outpaces the rest of Latin America, though
significant income inequality reveals the unintended consequences of neoliberal reform.
Paradoxically, Pinochet’s successes in various social policies, such as promoting universal
immunization and improving health infrastructure, depended on administrative
decentralization, as in health care, in direct contrast to centralization. As a result, one cannot
categorically claim that unitary governments provide greater social benefits, especially since
Uruguay and Chile – the two unitary governments – are both small countries with limited
geographic span, have relatively homogeneous populations, and adopt decentralization as a
strategy for resource allocation. In general, both Uruguay and Chile confront fewer challenges
in administering social welfare programs due to a combination of population demographics and
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geography. In comparison, the large federal republics – Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico – face
formidable difficulties in bureaucratic control and administration of social programs as a result
of sheer geographic area, large and heterogeneous population, and significant ethnic diversity.

Comparison of Results
Economic Performance
As Graph 1 illustrates, GDP annual growth rate is a rather volatile measure – from the
period of 1970 to 2006, Latin American countries underwent a series of boom‐bust cycles.
Economic growth rates across Latin America averaged 6% in the 1970s, fueled by an import‐
substitution strategy reliant on liquidity in sovereign debt markets, driven by the surplus of
investment from abroad. The 1980s, commonly referred to as the “lost decade”, however,
brought a period of severe recession with high oil prices, high interest rates, and the reduction
of liquidity as US dollars went to OPEC. With a looming debt crisis, Latin America’s GDP
contracted, shrinking to pre‐1970s levels. Inflation skyrocketed and debt service in the region
required approximately one‐third of the entire region’s export earnings.106
From the graph below, Chile seems to have weathered the shock better than the other
countries, managing to recover comparatively faster. In the 1990s, Chile also achieved higher,
more stable GDP growth rates, though the gap has eroded over time. Chile’s performance,
however, is less associated with its unitary structure than the strict macroeconomic discipline
and structural reforms initiated under the Pinochet regime that facilitated recovery and growth.
The GDP growth rates of the benchmark cases of Argentina and Brazil fluctuate wildly, often
not in synchronicity, though in the most recent periods, differences in GDP annual growth rates
have narrowed. As mentioned earlier, given Uruguay’s dependence on trade and remittances
from its large Latin American neighbors – notably Argentina and Brazil – its GDP growth rates
parallel that of the benchmark cases. Given Venezuela’s oil economy, the country managed to
recover in a more sustained fashion from the crisis of the 1980s – a result of rising oil exports
that buoyed GDP growth. From cursory inspection, GDP growth rates do not suggest that
federal governments achieve profoundly better performance – too many particularistic
elements of economic structure explain away the variation. Nevertheless, the fact that GDP
growth rates have stabilized and improved in the 1990s suggest that in addition to an upturn in
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the global macroeconomic context, decentralization reforms may have contributed to greater
economic performance.
Graph 1. GDP Annual Growth Rate (%)
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As shown in Graph 2, GDP per capita in Argentina outpaced the rest of Latin America for
the entire period from 1970‐2006. In fact, in 1900, Argentina had the sixth highest per capita
national income in the world, and was considered a potential economic rival to the United
States.107 Argentina’s failure to industrialize, however, caused the country to lag behind,
especially as agricultural and commodity prices began to fall. Brazil’s GDP per capita, however,
remains the lowest among the cases. As the fifth‐largest country in the world by geographical
area and the fifth most populous country108, GDP per capita stagnated as population growth
outpaced income growth.109 Hence, just from looking at Brazil and Argentina alone, it is difficult
to draw a conclusion about the GDP per capita of federal democracies given the wide variance.
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Chile achieved the greatest improvement as a result of structural reforms that enhanced
the overall macroeconomic context, bringing GDP per capita nearly monotonically upward
despite the economic shocks. Overall, GDP per capita has more than doubled from levels in the
early 1970s. GDP per capita for Mexico and Uruguay has also improved modestly with a gain
upwards of $2,000, approximately a 50% improvement from the early 1970s to the most
current period. Venezuela, however, has sustained a decline in GDP per capita, falling from
approximately $6,200 in the early 1970s to $4,700 recently. Since the 1990s, with the exception
of the Venezuela, GDP per capita has grown substantially after the stagnation of the 1980s.
Graph 2. GDP Per Capita (Constant 2000 USD)
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The aforementioned trends in GDP per capita extend to the trend in household final
consumption per capita, as shown in Graph 3. Argentina outpaces the rest of the countries,
while Brazil remains the lowest. Chile has improved the greatest, with modest gains in Mexico
and Uruguay. Venezuela, however, has experienced a decline in household final consumption
per capita. From inspection, it is difficult to draw a conclusion about the impact of governance
structure on economic performance, especially in light of the wide variation in the benchmark
cases and the particularistic elements of economic structure.
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Graph 3. Household Final Consumption Per Capita (Constant 2000 USD)
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As shown in Table 9, the federal democracies – Brazil and Argentina – appear to have
GINI coefficients that are on the high end. Throughout the period from 1980‐2006, Brazil had
the highest GINI coefficient. Developmental experts have intensively studied Brazil’s income
inequality, suggesting that heterogeneous levels of education in the work force account for
severe income inequality. International comparisons reveal that from the period of 1978 to
1998, although 70% of all countries in the world had a per capita income below Brazil’s, 10% of
the richest families in Brazil had access to 50% of the aggregate family income, while the
poorest 50% of households only accounted for 10% of aggregate income.110 According to a
recent World Bank study, the Real Plan – a policy of macroeconomic stabilization – contributed
to the recent modest reduction in the GINI coefficient.111 Argentina’s GINI coefficient, however,
has worsened over the past decades – a result of adopting neoliberal policies. Altimir attributes
the deterioration in income equality to growing unemployment in the successive crises in the
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1980s, and unemployment generated by the restructuring of production and the increase in
labor force participation in the 1990s.112
Chile has the second highest GINI coefficient, although the level of absolute poverty has
fallen. As a result of liberalization, privatization, and other macroeconomic reforms, the income
distribution of Chile has changed in the following manner: the entire distribution has shifted to
the right such that nearly everybody has earned more than previously, the dispersion of the
distribution remains broadly stable so that the level of overall inequality has not changed
greatly, and a simultaneously compression and expansion of the tails signifies that inequality
among the rich has increased, though inequality of the poor has declined.113 As aforementioned,
to combat the high level of disparity, Chile has used decentralization as a mechanism to reduce
regional inequalities.
Uruguay has one of the lowest GINI coefficients, in light of the country’s agriculturally‐
oriented economic structure, similar geographic clime, and small population. In the period of
marked trade liberalization from 1990‐1994, the GINI coefficient of Mexico worsened, but then
moderated in the last two periods. Especially in perspective with Mexico’s recent reforms to
increase the level of decentralization and responsibility of sub‐national governments as a
mechanism to reduce intra‐regional inequity, the moderation of inequality could potentially be
attributed to these efforts. Venezuela, however, has registered a significant decrease in the
GINI coefficient from 55.8 in the earliest period to 46.1 more recently, attesting to the efficacy
of the government’s pro‐poor, socialist reforms.
Table 9. GINI Coefficient
GINI Index
Brazil (Fed/Dem)
Argentina (Fed/Dem)
Venezuela (Fed/Dem, low A)
Uruguay (AFed/Dem)
Mexico (Fed/Dict)
Chile (Unitary/Dem)
Benchmark (Average)

1980-1984
57.7
NA
55.8
43.7
46.3
NA
57.7

1985-1989
59.3
44.5
48.8
42.3
NA
57.2
51.9

1990-1994
60.3
45.4
41.7
NA
51.1
55.3
52.8

1995-1999
59.6
49.2
49.2
44.5
48.8
57.5
54.4

2000-2006
58.1
52.1
46.1
44.7
49.2
56.3
55.1

Source: World Development Indicators, 2007
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As shown below in Graph 4, according to the Heritage Foundation, Chile has one of the
highest rankings in overall economic freedom, a combination of the elements of: business
freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment
freedom, financial freedom, poverty rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom.
Uruguay is ranked second, with Mexico and Brazil making moderate improvements over time.
The scores of Argentina and Venezuela, however, have worsened over time, especially in light
of Argentina’s default in 2001 and the series of nationalizations of private enterprises that have
occurred in Venezuela under the Chavez presidency.
Graph 4. Heritage Foundation – Index of Economic Freedom
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Implications
In general, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the contribution of
governance structure on the level of economic performance, especially since as discussed
earlier in each of the case analysis implications, federalism has a rather ambiguous effect on
economic growth. Nevertheless, from the indicator analysis presented above, the following
trends emerge:
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1. Unitary governments in Latin America appear to have the political consensus to promote
policies which increase the level of economic freedom. Chile and Uruguay have a higher
ranking in terms of economic freedom, although the gap has declined with time. As
aforementioned, unitary governments generally have greater political consensus necessary
to pass comprehensive economic reforms. In general, unitary governments reduce the
overall number of political offices available, which in turn, reduces the level of political
fragmentation. In contrast, in federal democracies, layers of sub‐national actors and
increased level of political competition potentially incubate potential dissent to
macroeconomic reform, especially with the fragmentation of political parties. As parties
fragment, most notably in the case of Brazil, important macroeconomic reforms may stall in
indefinite political contestation.
2. The economic performance of the federal governments does not appear consistent with
each other. GDP per capita of the two federal democracies – Brazil and Argentina –
represent the min and max of the region. Likewise, GDP growth rates often move in
opposite directions, as in the period from 1985‐1999, in which significant growth gains in
Brazil corresponded to stagnation in Argentina, and vice‐versa. These results confirm the
analysis in the case implications section that federalism often results in mixed economic
performance, especially in light of the constant tension between centralization and
decentralization of central government involvement in the economy and the complexity of
ascertaining political capital in a federation to promote macroeconomic reform.
3. Reform‐oriented dictatorship under unitary governments potentially increases economic
performance. Chile’s significant GDP growth, gains in GDP per capita, and high ranking in
the economic freedom index support the implications that unitary governments provide the
structure for reform‐oriented dictatorships to institute significant macroeconomic reforms.
As anecdotal support of the benevolent dictatorship theory, it appears that similar to Lee
Kuan Yew of Singapore, Chiang Kai Shek of Taiwan, and General Park of South Korea,
Pinochet played an instrumental role in Chile’s economic “miracle” through his ability to
implement austere reforms for macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal restraint.
Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that military dictatorships in other Latin American
countries – Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina – did not yield significant improvements in any
economic indicators, especially since the ruling military elites did not prioritize economic
reform as their political agenda. Likewise, Mexico’s greatest economic improvement did not
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correspond to its experience under PRI dictatorship, but rather, with the introduction of
political competition and democratic reforms. In addition, the human costs of such
dictatorships, quantified in terms of human rights abuses and a widening income gap, must
be weighed against the benefits, especially since economic gains may be short‐lived.
4. Despite implications #1 and #3, increasing centralization potentially decreases economic
performance. Buoyed by high oil prices, one may expect Venezuela’s economic indicators to
have improved dramatically in the most recent periods. High GDP growth, however, does
not correspond with a substantial improvement in annual household consumption, which
has largely stagnated or declined. Most significantly, the index of economic freedom has
continually dropped in Venezuela, corresponding with increasing government centralization
and government involvement in the economy under the Chavez administration, manifested
in the nationalization of foreign companies and the use of price controls. Hence, the data
confirms the analysis that since federalism potentially intensifies political fragmentation
and creates a power vacuum for a populist leader, the lack of institutional checks coupled
with fiscal centralization could lead to deteriorating economic freedom and performance.
Likewise, Menem’s reforms to centralize central government control over the economy
precipitated the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001, especially in light of reforms
that failed to curtail fiscal irresponsibility at the regional level, yet held the economy pegged
to an unsustainable exchange rate.
Rights Indicators
As shown in Graphs 5 and 6, the majority of Latin American countries endured
repressive military regimes in the 1970s, which eventually devolved to civilian rule by the mid
to late 1980s. Venezuela is the exception to this trend, in which the Pérez Jiménez military
dictatorship lost credibility in 1958, giving way to true democratic reform. As a result,
Venezuela enjoyed democratic political and civil rights long before its Latin American neighbors.
Steady improvements in political and civil rights can be observed in nearly all of the
countries, with exception to Venezuela, which has experienced a recent erosion of rights as a
result of the Chavez presidency and increasing reforms to centralize government and remove
important checks and balances. As shown in Graph 5, Mexico’s political rights have not
improved significantly until recently – a consequence of PRI domination and institutionalized
electoral fraud. Overall, increasing political rights correspond with many federal and
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decentralization reforms, which emphasized increasing political representation at the local level
and promoting greater autonomy of sub‐national actors to check central government.
Graph 5. Freedom House – Political Rights
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From a civil rights perspective (Graph 6), the majority of Latin American countries have
experienced a marked improvement, especially as civilian advocacy groups denounced the
human rights atrocities committed under military rule and as democratic governments
enshrined civil and human rights in constitutional reforms, as elucidated in earlier case study
section. Venezuela, however, is the exception as the government has become increasingly
intolerant of dissident opinion. Chile and Uruguay have made the greatest improvements as the
devolution of military rule has left lasting democratic reforms with an emphasis on the
protection of civil rights.
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Graph 6. Freedom House – Civil Rights
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Corruption perception is an important measure, as it directly affects the level of
government accountability, efficiency in resource allocation, and the capacity to attract foreign
investment. Chile ranks as one of the most cleanly perceived governments – a legacy of the
Pinochet regime that emphasized reduction of government influence in the economy,
neoliberal reforms, and a desire to model government under private enterprise. Augusto
Pinochet himself once said, “[Military rule aims] to make Chile not a nation of proletarians, but
a nation of entrepreneurs."114 In order to attract investment and restore business confidence in
Chile, Pinochet established a legacy of strict adherence to fiscal and macroeconomic
accountability and created a culture intolerant of corruption, though his own personal
corruption remains a source of hypocrisy.115 Uruguay has also made important institutional
arrangements against corruption, thus becoming Latin America’s second least corrupt country,
according to Transparency International. For example, on August 12, 1997, Uruguay passed into
114

Dandan, Zaldy. "Gracias mi general" Marianas Variety. 2006.
<http://www.mvariety.com/editorialpage/editorial01.htm> Accessed: April 12, 2008
115
Kornbluh, Peter. “The Secret Pinochet Portfolio.” National Security Archive. 15 March 2005.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB149/index.htm> Accessed: April 13, 2008

52

law the Inter‐American Convention against Corruption. As a relatively small country, Uruguay
has maintained relatively effective oversight over the accountability of its officials and
instituted a culture intolerance of corruption.116
Argentina and Brazil have currently relatively similar corruption perceptions measures,
although Argentina experienced a marked deterioration in corruption perception in the period
of 1985‐1994. The economic shocks and its consequences of eroding the middle class and
causing great unemployment eroded many important institutional checks on corruption.117 In
addition, the Menem and de la Rúa administrations were associated with rampant political
corruption, including pandering spoils to the masses in return for electoral security.118 Mexico
has made moderate gains in reducing the perception of corruption, largely with electoral
reform and the ending of PRI domination, while Brazil has more or less remained at similar
levels to the past. Perhaps as a consequence of oil rents, Venezuela has one of the worst
corruption perceptions ranking, especially since a large portion of oil revenue passes through
the government. According to Gustavo Coronel, corruption in Venezuela stems from three main
causes: motive, opportunity, and impunity. As an example of the resource curse, thousands of
public employees who feel underpaid monetize their public offices illegally, protected by the
lack of administrative procedures and controls, chaotic management of bureaucrats, and low
possibility of penalization. Coronel estimates that approximately $10 billion has been stolen
under the Chavez administration with no punitive measures.119
Many experts have intensively studied the relationship between decentralization and
corruption, especially since decentralization has achieved acceptability as a developmental
paradigm against the inefficiency of centralized states. In theory, decentralization can reduce
corruption and minimize the undersupply of infrastructure support for private investors
through inter‐jurisdictional competition. In addition, decentralization reforms can conceivably
harden budget constraints so that governments do not bail out inefficient enterprises.120
Simultaneously, however, decentralization introduces new problems of agency, oversight, and
inter‐jurisdictional externalities. An empirical, cross‐country study by Fisman and Gatti
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confirmed that a strong negative relationship exists between fiscal decentralization in
government expenditure and corruption. Theoretically, by devolving power to local levels,
centralized bureaucracy loses its monopoly to divert resources to the non‐poor, especially in
light of willingness to pay bribes.121 Nevertheless, the predictive capacity of the model remains
nebulous, as the relationship between decentralization and corruption depends on legal origins
and other country‐particularistic elements.
Graph 7. Transparency International – Corruption Perceptions Index
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Implications
Regardless of governance structure, rights performance in Latin America has
substantially improved as military government transitioned to civilian rule. The following trends
emerge from the data:
1. Unitary governments (especially when democratic) appear to be less corrupt. Chile and
Uruguay, both unitary governments, have a lower level of perceived corruption. Especially
since unitary governments remove additional layers of bureaucracy and have greater
central government oversight on public funds and projects, such governance structures may
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effectively reduce the level of corruption. Conversely, the large federal democracies rank at
the higher end of perceived corruption. In theory, introducing more government layers and
creating a complex system of inter‐governmental transfers potentially increases the
opportunity for corrupt activities. In addition, increased political competition potentially
incentivizes vote‐pandering activities and potential clientelism. These results coincide with
published empirical studies that investigate the link between corruption and federal
governance structures. According to an empirical study by Plekhanov, federal structure of
government may contribute to the persistence of corruption, as voters may be incentivized
to elect rent‐seeing politicians for their own personal benefit.122 Plekhanov’s model reveals
that corruption at the federal level may be contagious at the regional level as well, hence
contributing to the persistence of corruption. Nevertheless, centralization in federal
governments may also increase the level of corruption, as in the case of Brazil and
Argentina under military rule and in Venezuela, where concentration of fiscal power and oil
revenue at the central level has bred rent‐seeking behaviors and spoils. Consequently,
finding the appropriate balance presents a formidable challenge.
2. Decentralization and federalism provide an institutional check for democratic
accountability and help in rights performance. Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico have both
experienced a substantial improvement in civil and political rights. In the case of Mexico,
democratization corresponded with increasing decentralization and enforcement of federal
precepts established in the constitution, especially since such reforms increased political
competition and opened up new channels of representation and dissent. Similarly, in Brazil
and Argentina, the institution of federal republic created an institutional structure that
would purposefully diffuse the centralized power structure that had existed under military
rule. By introducing new layers of representation, federalism provides a mechanism to
check potential government abuse of civil rights and to introduce more avenues of political
participation and the exercise of democratic prerogatives.
3. Unitary governments have accomplished similar improvements in rights performance
through enhancing direct democracy and municipal representation – a form of
decentralization at a local level. The profound impact of the rising import of municipal
politics in Uruguay and Chile attest to the fact that even in unitary governments,
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decentralization and increasing representation at the local level have a positive effect on
democratic accountability and rights performance. As in the case of the Frente Amplio’s role
in creating participatory representation at the municipal level in Uruguay and intensification
of plebiscitary politics in Chile, unitary governments have recognized the benefits of
creating democratic institutions at the local level – a form of decentralization that parallels
the reforms of the largest federal republics at a smaller scale. Decentralization through
municipalization thus improves political representation and civil rights.
Health and Other Social Indicators
Although Chile outpaced the rest of Latin America in the earlier periods, the majority of
Latin American countries have converged in terms of providing DPT immunization (Graph 8). In
explaining Chile’s initial ability to reach such a large proportion of children, the Pinochet
regime decentralized the centralized health care system, shifting resources away from the
hospitals in the major cities to more widely dispersed primary health care clinics under
municipal control, which emphasized preventative measures such as immunization and
education in basic hygiene.123
In fact, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela – all the countries in this case
study – have pursued health care decentralization reforms in the past twenty years, to varying
degrees of success. At the beginning of the 1980s, health care systems in Latin America
generally provided a low quality of health services and used financial resources inefficiently.
Decentralization of health care served as an avenue to increase the efficiency and
responsiveness of government because the devolution of resource allocation decisions to
locally elected leaders would better match the mix of services produced by the public sector
and the preferences of the local population.124 As a result of decentralization, better access to
health for the poor and emphasis on preventative care emerged, which explains the dramatic
improvement in immunization. Throughout the past two decades, the World Bank, United
Nations, USAID, and Inter‐American Development Bank all have emphasized the importance of
decentralization in their health care policy recommendations and health programs.
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Graph 8. Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12‐23 months)
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As illustrated in Graph 9, the majority of countries have a similar upward trend in life
expectancy, especially given the simultaneous reforms in the health care system and
improvement in the overall macroeconomic context. The benchmark cases of Argentina and
Brazil exhibit wide deviation, as Argentina has a life expectancy at the median, while Brazil has
the lowest life expectancy throughout the period. Especially since Brazil has a much greater
population, assuring access to health care and confronting severe income disparities have
posed difficult policy challenges. A study by Messias confirmed that illiteracy rates and income
disparities were negatively associated with life expectancy in Brazil, thus confirming the
relationship between income distribution and health outcomes.125 As Brazil has the highest GINI
coefficient of all the countries in this case study, its comparative lower life expectancy at birth
may reflect the pernicious effects of socioeconomic inequality. Mexico and Chile exhibit the
greatest improvement in life expectancy at birth, while Uruguay, Argentina, and Venezuela
illustrate modest gains over time.
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Graph 9. Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)
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In regards to the percentage of the population following below the $2/day PPP
threshold (Graph 10), Brazil, Mexico, and Chile made substantial improvements, while poverty
increased significantly in Argentina and Venezuela. The poverty headcount in Uruguay has
remained roughly similar throughout the four decade period. The recent deterioration in the
poverty headcount percentage in Argentina can be explained by the exchange rate devaluation
and financial crisis of 2001, in which many residents either lost their savings or found their
value eroded by skyrocketing inflation. At the beginning of the 1980s, Argentina had one of the
lowest poverty rates in Latin America, but now ranks at the median.
In the early 1990s, poverty increased in Venezuela as a result of series of neoliberal
reforms that privatized various public services as well as important state‐owned enterprises in
oil and mining, thus spurring unemployment. It remains to be seen whether the nationalization
of oil and natural resource companies will improve Venezuela’s poverty gap. Since Chavez
garners the greatest support from impoverished barrios, his anti‐poverty record has a dramatic
impact on his political capital.
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Graph 10. Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)
45.0
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
1970-1974

1975-1979

1980-1984

Brazil (Fed/Dem)
Venezuela (Fed/Dem, low A)
Mexico (Fed/Dict)

1985-1989

1990-1994

Argentina (Fed/Dem)
Uruguay (AFed/Dem)
Chile (Unitary/Dem)
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Implications
Administrative federalism and decentralization improves access to health and other
public goods. Regardless of governance structure, decentralization of health and social services
appear to improve access. For example, under Pinochet’s unitary government, shifting
resources away from the hospitals in the major cities to more widely dispersed primary health
care clinics under municipal control – a form of decentralization – contributed to high rates of
immunization and other preventative measures such as education in basic hygiene, which
proved essential for overall health. As a result, Chile outpaced the rest of Latin America during
this period, in which all other countries utilized centralized health care systems.
In fact, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela – all the countries for this
case study – have pursued health care decentralization reforms in the past twenty years. As
shown in the indicators, for all of these countries, life expectancy at birth has greatly increased
and poverty headcount have significantly decreased, thus suggesting a connection between
decentralization and increased access to health care and services. In general, decentralization
of social services increases the efficiency and impact of public goods and resources because
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local agents generally have a better understanding of the preferences and priorities of the local
population. Unsurprisingly, the indicators confirm the analysis in the case study section that
linked decentralization reforms to greater equity in access social goods. As a result, the data
supports the policy recommendations of various international developmental agencies which
advocate decentralization as a mechanism for improved delivery of public goods. As federal
governments require a political structure of decentralization, assign significant administrative
responsibilities to sub‐national actors, and give sub‐national governments greater fiscal latitude,
one may reasonably conclude that federalism provides an institutional framework that
facilitates an optimal structure for the delivery of public goods and social welfare programs.
Rural‐Urban Dynamic
To analyze whether federalism has contributed to more effective provision of services at
both a rural and urban level, one can analyze disparities in access to basic needs. In theory,
decentralization would aid in decreasing the rural‐urban divide by concentrating resource
allocation and access at the local level. As shown in Table 10, urbanization has occurred over
the past three decades throughout Latin America, dramatically altering the rural‐urban
composition. With the explosion of primate cities such as Sao Paolo, Mexico City, and Buenos
Aires, many rural residents have migrated to the cities in search of greater opportunities, only
to form slums and settlements outside of the city’s fringes. Throughout the period, Uruguay
has one of the most urbanized populations out of the six countries.
Table 10. Urban Population (% of total population)
Urban population (% of total)
Brazil (Fed/Dem)
Argentina (Fed/Dem)
Venezuela (Fed/Dem, low A)
Uruguay (AFed/Dem)
Mexico (Fed/Dict)
Chile (Unitary/Dem)
Benchmark (Average)

1970-1974

1975-1979
58.2
79.7
73.3
82.8
60.5
76.5
69.0

1980-1984
64.0
81.8
77.2
84.2
64.2
79.5
72.9

69.0
83.7
80.4
86.1
67.6
81.8
76.4

1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2006
72.7
76.0
79.2
83.0
85.8
87.5
88.6
89.7
82.7
85.6
89.2
92.5
87.9
89.6
90.8
91.7
70.8
72.9
73.9
75.5
82.9
83.7
85.0
86.9
79.3
81.7
83.9
86.4

Source: World Development Indicators, 2007
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Table 11. Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities (Rural vs. Urban)
Improved sanitation facilities (% of total population with
access)
Brazil (Fed/Dem)
Argentina (Fed/Dem)
Venezuela (Fed/Dem, low A)
Uruguay (AFed/Dem)
Mexico (Fed/Dict)
Chile (Unitary/Dem)
Benchmark (Average)

1990-1994
71.0
81.0
NA
100.0
58.0
84.0
76.0

1995-1999
73.0
86.0
68.0
100.0
67.0
87.0
79.5

2000-2006
74.5
90.0
68.0
100.0
77.0
90.5
82.3

Improved sanitation facilities (% of rural population with
access)
Brazil (Fed/Dem)
Argentina (Fed/Dem)
Venezuela (Fed/Dem, low A)
Uruguay (AFed/Dem)
Mexico (Fed/Dict)
Chile (Unitary/Dem)
Benchmark (Average)

1990-1994
37.0
45.0
NA
99.0
13.0
52.0
41.0

1995-1999
37.0
59.0
48.0
99.0
25.0
57.0
48.0

2000-2006
37.0
78.5
48.0
99.0
39.0
62.0
57.8

% Difference (Rural and Total Population)
Brazil (Fed/Dem)
Argentina (Fed/Dem)
Venezuela (Fed/Dem, low A)
Uruguay (AFed/Dem)
Mexico (Fed/Dict)
Chile (Unitary/Dem)
Benchmark (Average)

1990-1994
34.0
36.0
NA
1.0
45.0
32.0
35.0

1995-1999
36.0
27.0
20.0
1.0
42.0
30.0
31.5

2000-2006
37.5
11.5
20.0
1.0
38.0
28.5
24.5

Source: World Development Indicators, 2007126
Argentina has one of the lowest rural‐urban gaps, while Brazil and Mexico have one of
the highest. Although all three are federal governments, it remains difficult to conclude that
federalism contributes to this disparity. Chile and Uruguay, both unitary countries, have a much
lower rural‐urban disparity, partly since Chile has an overall higher level of income and Uruguay
faces lower administrative difficulty in providing access, given its small size.
Implications
1. Federal governments in Latin America appear to be characterized by a greater urban‐rural
gap. In general, Mexico and Brazil exhibit a significant access gap between the rural and
total population. In perspective, these two countries have the greatest rural population as a
percentage of total population. Generally, federal governments are geographically larger
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than unitary governments. In Latin America, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico clearly dwarf
Uruguay and Chile in terms of total geographic area. As a result, such large governments
utilize federalism as a mechanism to solve the challenges of oversight and representation
over an expansive geography. Especially in light of a high rural‐urban gap, countries may
perceive federalism as a viable method of increasing local representation that would
effectively allocate resources to difficult to reach areas. As aforementioned, the Mexican
government justified federal reforms to improve the efficiency and equality of resource
allocation. Hence, this implication suggests that a high rural‐urban divide, especially when
coupled with a large geography, may compel a country towards adopting federalism as a
governance structure.
2. Decentralization reforms potentially aid in the process of reducing the rural‐urban gap. As
aforementioned, the persistence of a rural‐urban gap over a large geographic area may
provide a compelling reason to create federal institutions. For example, politicians have
invoked federalism and decentralization reforms as a mechanism to reduce inequities
across states in Mexico, as in the case of public education and health. With the exception of
Brazil, the urban‐rural access gap has decreased over the last three periods, coinciding with
second‐generation decentralization reforms. In particular, Argentina provides a clear
example of a substantial reduction in the urban‐rural access gap, in which the gap fell from
36% from 1990‐1994 to 11.5% in the most recent period. Likewise, Mexico registered a 7%
improvement. Although unitary governments have also improved, the magnitude of change
is smaller. Hence, the indicator appears to confirm the implication that federal institutions
can aid in the process of reducing a rural‐urban divide.

Conclusions
Fundamentally, federalism’s appeal derives from a general conviction that
decentralization improves economic and political performance and accountability. An analysis
of the governance structure, historical evolution, and various economic, rights, and social
indicators of six Latin American countries suggest that federalism provides positive benefits,
thus confirming the Inman’s conclusion that decentralization provides unique benefits.
Federalism’s aggregate contribution to economic and rights performance, however, depends
largely on the actual political dynamic particular to each country. As illustrated in the analysis, a
cursory survey of the Constitution and the use of broad indicators, such as average revenue
assignment and presence of democracy over the past 40 years, mask the fact that in actuality,
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countries such as Mexico and Venezuela may have not their explicit political objectives
enumerated in the Constitution. The following four conclusions summarize the main findings of
the case study:
1. Diffusion of political power improves rights performance and democratic accountability,
of which federalism provides an important institutional framework.
In Mexico, the strengthening of federal institutions opened up new electoral spaces that
promoted political party competition that eventually led to reform and democratization. In
addition, the federal reforms bred coalitions that provided an important institutional check
against existent power structures and PRI domination (Pages 32‐36, 50‐52). Likewise in
Argentina and Brazil, federalism played an important role in strengthening democratic
institutions after a long period of military rule (Pages 7‐8, 11‐12, 14‐15, 18‐19, 50‐52). The
constitutional structure of democratic federalism provided an important check on government
to ensure representation at local levels, which military rule had suppressed (Pages 7‐8).
Federalism also provided an essential constraint on presidential or executive power – a
mechanism to prevent political rights abuses that had occurred under military rule (Page 11).
In unitary governments such as Chile and Uruguay, increasing municipalization – a form
of decentralization – has strengthened political voice, participation, and representation at the
local level (Pages 27‐29, 38‐39). As Uruguay implemented elections at the municipal level and
improved the institutions of direct democracy, traditions of direct and participatory democracy
have considerably progressed, from direct citizen referendums to the rise of civil society
organizations aiming to engage municipal governments (Pages 27‐31). In fact, despite the
Constitution’s declaration of unitary governance, the government of Uruguay reflects a high
degree of political and fiscal decentralization, similar to that of federal republics (Page 27).
Likewise in Chile, the rising appeal and predominance of local office has created new channels
of political participation in plebiscitary politics and increased the level of representation at the
local level (Page 42).
Conversely, Venezuela has slowly increased the level of centralization, moving away
from its long federal traditions (Pages 22‐24) – most notably in the recent Chavez
administration. Overall, federalism has a rather ambiguous effect on democratic accountability
and rights performance in Venezuela. Although the current weakening of federal institutions
under the Chavez regime has decreased rights performance (Pages 23‐24, 50‐52), federalism
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itself had contributed to a new political context that facilitated the rise of populist leaders due
to political fragmentation (Page 25‐26). Likewise, as Latin America’s most centralized federation,
the concentration of fiscal power at the central government reduces the capacity of state and
local governments to check such populist leaders, who have the resources to enact broad policy
changes, often financed by oil revenues (Page 23‐24). Hence, as shown in the case of Venezuela,
fiscal centralization increased the ease of political centralization, especially since sub‐national
governments depend on the resources and support of the central government. Nevertheless,
the federal system in Venezuela has provided important checks against Chavez’s increasing
political agenda to consolidate his executive power (Page 26).
2. The contribution of federalism to aggregate economic performance remains ambiguous.
Federalism’s effect on economic performance remains ambiguous, seen through the
examples of Brazil and Argentina (Pages 43‐50). As Brazil’s history attests, various institutional
factors influence the ability of federalism to affect central government. In Brazil, federalism
constrained the ability of the president to enact much‐needed economic reforms in the early
1980s due to a high degree of political fragmentation and dissent. As a result, state debts to
federal government burgeoned and state governments stalled much‐needed macroeconomic
stabilization policies. Federalism under the Cardoso regime, however, differed dramatically. By
managing to obtain multi‐party support and overcoming the divisive nature of political
fragmentation, Cardoso created coherency and consensus in the Brazilian government, thus
managing to control inflation and improve macroeconomic stability with broad support from
Congress (Page 15‐16). In Argentina, centralization of tax revenues and fiscal power in the
central government under the Menem administration led to initial macroeconomic
improvement in comparison to earlier administrations that had a greater level of fiscal
decentralization, the results were short‐lived as neoliberal reforms failed to deliver sustained
benefits (Page 19‐20).
In Mexico, federal reforms of the 1990s coincided with economic liberalization and
profound economic transition, which generated income growth, investment, and productivity
increases (Pages 37, 43‐50). The direct link between federalism and economic reform, however,
remains tenuous, especially since fiscal federalism introduced new problems of fiscal
irresponsibility at the sub‐national level (Pages 8‐9, 37). Fiscal irresponsibility, however, can
also exist in unitary governments, as in the case of Uruguay, in which financial indiscretion by
sub‐national actors occurs through accumulating debts with other government agencies and
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obtaining discretionary transfers from the central government (Page 28, 31). As discussed in an
Inter‐American Development Bank report, first generation decentralization reforms in the early
1990s in Latin America often failed to take into account market‐based principles, such as
incentives and public choice theory, thus destabilizing the overall macroeconomic framework,
especially in light of haphazard government spending (Pages 8‐9).
In comparing federal to unitary governments, Chile sets an example of a unitary
government with significant economic performance. Pinochet’s purported economic “miracle”
in Chile reflects less on its unitary structure, but on the specific policies of the administration
(Page 38‐39, 43‐50). The military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay all centralized
government and created varying degrees of unitary rule, but failed to accomplish
macroeconomic reform. Nevertheless, unitary and centralized rule, however, does increase the
ease of enacting comprehensive reform (Pages 38‐39, 41‐42, 49). Without political competition
or dissent, Pinochet could implement unpopular policies, such as the sale of state‐owned
enterprises and the privatization of public utilities. The social costs, however, remain great. In
addition, dictatorships have also entrenched opportunities for acute corruption and the misuse
of public resources for private gain. A survey of dictatorships in the world today exposes the
fact that plenty of autocratic rulers exist without accomplishing economic reform.
3. Decentralization improves access to public goods, in both federal and unitary
governments.
Throughout the past two decades, the World Bank, United Nations, USAID, and Inter‐
American Development Bank have all emphasized the importance of decentralization in social
welfare programs. In theory, decentralization of social services increases the efficiency and
impact of public goods and resources because local agents are often more attuned to the
preferences and priorities of the local population. As confirmed in the indicators and analysis of
historical evolution, decentralization and administrative federalism have increased access to
social goods, lowered regional inequities, and improved efficiency in resource allocation by
taking into account local priorities (Pages 56‐62). For example, in Argentina, decentralization
reduced intra‐regional disparities and increased on aggregate the level of human development
in the areas of health and education (Page 19).
Decentralization benefits both unitary and federal governments. Most notably, under
Pinochet’s unitary government, the municipalization of the hospital system contributed to high
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rates of immunization – well above the performance of all other Latin American countries
which had adopted centralized health systems (Page 56‐57). In fact, all the case study countries
– Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Chile – have pursued health care
decentralization reforms in the past twenty years. As shown in the indicators, life expectancy at
birth, immunization, and poverty headcount reflect a connection between decentralization and
increased access to health care and services (Pages 56‐60). Acting like ‘service delivery agents’,
municipal governments in Chile provided local public service on a cost‐effective basis, without
having local governing power (Page 38‐39). In Uruguay, the reorganization of municipal
administration increased the level of social accountability, thus facilitating social investment
and access to urban public goods (Pages 28‐29).
In regards to federalism’s unique contribution, federal governments generally require a
political structure of decentralization. In most cases, sub‐national actors in federal countries
have significant administrative responsibilities and greater fiscal latitude, thus providing an
institutional framework that facilitates an optimal structure of delivery of public goods and
information. Nevertheless, decentralization reforms can still be effectively carried out in unitary
governments, which use municipal channels and other regional government networks.
Conversely, federal governments that have a degree of fiscal centralization and limited
administrative responsibilities at the sub‐national level, such as in Mexico before the 1990s, do
not harness the full benefits of decentralization (Pages 32‐33, 36).
4. Federalism, however, potentially creates political fragmentation that may block
important reforms or give rise to a power vacuum for populist leaders. As a result, rights
performance, democratic accountability, and economic and social progress may stall or
deteriorate.
Most notably, in Venezuela, the enhanced political competition, the division between
regional and national elections, the reelection of governors and mayors, and an increase in
their financial autonomy – all – all characteristic aspects of federalism – contributed to the
fragmentation of the party system and to the personalization of the vote (Pages 23, 25‐26). 127
With intensified political competition, governors and mayors took advantage of windows of
opportunity to enhance their own political power and weaken the power of party leaders. As
accountability, transparency, and political competition increased, personalization of the vote
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undermined entrenched powers, giving rise to populist outsiders such as Chavez. Nevertheless,
according to Penfold‐Becerra, despite Chavez’s success in increasing presidential power, he
remains unable to undermine the full federal system, especially since direct election of regional
and sub‐national authorities check executive influence – an example of federalism’s positive
contribution to democratic accountability through increased layers of political competition and
oversight (Page 26).
Although federalism stalled economic reform in Brazil (Page 15) and created a political
vacuum in Venezuela, federalism actually strengthening a unified coalition against the PRI in
Mexico, enhancing political cohesiveness rather than undermining the party system. In fact,
federalism played an essential role in improving electoral transparency and facilitating the
presidential transition from the PRI party to the “Alliance for Change” candidate Vicente Fox in
2000 (Page 35‐36). As a result, determining the net effect of federalism on the party system
requires careful analysis of the unique political context of the country.
In general, the findings appear to support Inman’s conclusions. The case studies confirm
that decentralization uniquely contributes to the protection of property, political, and civil
rights. In addition, although unitary governments can benefit from policy decentralization,
federalism provides an important institutional framework to maintain and support
decentralization with adequate fiscal and administrative support. 128 The effect of
decentralization and federalism on economic performance in Latin America, however, remains
ambiguous, contrary to Inman’s original findings. His third conclusion, that adding policy
decentralization does not improve economic or rights performance in dictatorships remains
untested as the military dictatorships of Latin America corresponded with a period of
centralization. Although Chile benefited economically from centralization, the other countries
suffered from severe economic mismanagement, which further sparked the impetus for return
to civilian rule. In all cases, political and civil rights suffered under military dictatorship.
In general, the insights of this case study provide a series of useful policy implications for
Latin American countries by analyzing the relationship between decentralization and
governance structure on economic, rights, and social performance. As Latin America’s three
largest countries – Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina – are federal republics, comprising 65% of the
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region’s population, understanding the dynamics of federalism and analyzing its associated
political and economic outcomes is essential to promoting human development.
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